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ABSTRACT 
Brandon M. Jenkins, THE IMPACTS OF PERFORMANCE FUNDING ON THE FACULTY 
EXPERIENCE: VIEWING FACULTY AS STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS OR PASSIVE 
RECIPIENTS (Under the direction of Dr. David Siegel). Department of Educational Leadership, 
May 2020.  
 
  This comparative case study examined how performance funding programs shape the 
faculty experiences at two North Carolina Community Colleges. Using Principal-Agent Theory, 
Street-Level Bureaucracy, and Bottom-Up Policy Perspective as theoretical frameworks, six 
themes and four subthemes emerged from semi-structured interviews of twenty community 
college faculty members. The study revealed that (1) faculty experiences are shaped according to 
the institutions’ overall capacity and response to performance funding; (2) the awareness of 
faculty regarding performance funding is dependent upon the institutions’ efforts to share 
information; and (3) depending upon the institution, faculty can be seen as both street-level 
bureaucrats and passive recipients of performance funding initiatives. While performance 
funding programs can result in the Principal-Agent dynamic, Bottom-Up Policy Perspective, and 
street-level bureaucracy, each of these is dependent upon the sharing of information. Institutional 
efforts to improve performance often negate the demands on faculty time and fail to include 
faculty in decision making processes. Furthermore, institutional budget concerns take precedence 
and create greater problems than those of performance funding.  Finally, key practical 
implications for community colleges and educational systems are that (1) information regarding 
performance funding and any subsequent budgetary allotments should be readily available to all 
faculty; (2) institutional initiatives and response mechanisms aimed at improving performance 
should be inclusive of the entire faculty body; (3) significant attention should be given to the 
conditions that lead to the weakening of academic standards; and (4) educational systems should 
examine performance funding systems while weighing the capability of all institutions to 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 Like other private and public organizations, institutions of higher education have 
increasingly been impacted by accountability initiatives designed to improve overall efficiency, 
effectiveness, and quality. As a result, institutions of higher education are being measured by 
their ability to improve perceived areas of historical concern such as low graduation rates, job 
placement for graduates, program length of study, and measures of retention and success. As a 
means of improving overall transparency and increasing accountability, many states have begun 
focusing on accountability initiatives that are directly aimed at improving institutional 
assessment models, system linkages between two-year and four-year institutions, and funding 
models that reward high performing institutions through increased funding allocations (Burke & 
Associates, 2005; Burke & Serban, 1998; Keller, 1995; McGuinness, 1995; McLendon, 2003b; 
Volkwein, 2007; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008). Policy makers nationwide have resorted to 
performance funding mechanisms to persuade and induce higher education to embrace a culture 
of assessment, system-wide improvement, and overall transparency. The impacts of 
accountability initiatives such as these are further compounded at times by struggling economies 
and equally constrained state budgets. 
 At its core, performance funding is merely a component of a larger performance 
management doctrine that originated in the public sector (Moynihan, 2008). With its 
implementation, performance management promised the proper allocation of resources, 
decisions rooted in strategy, improved processes, and employees who are engaged due to the use 
of performance data and reward systems (Moynihan, 2008). Until the last few decades, 
accountability efforts such as these had largely evaded higher education. According to Rabovsky 
(2014), prior to performance funding initiatives, accountability in higher education was largely 
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process-based and provided little oversight or opposition to autonomous institutions. 
Performance funding systems began to take root during the 1970s and have gained significant 
traction since the early 2000s. As of 2015, thirty-three states were operating performance 
funding systems and several more were investigating such programs (Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, 
Natow, Pheatt, & Reddy, 2016; Dougherty, Natow, Jones, Lahr, Pheatt, & Reddy, 2014). 
 While both community colleges and four-year institutions are presently impacted by 
performance funding models, community colleges are unique due to their diverse student 
populations and growing role in economic growth and community development. The community 
college offers a variety of programs and activities that include vocational training, continuing 
education, adult literacy, college transfer, and cultural enrichment for the community As 
Lattimore (2011) notes, “the community college, at this point in its history, is at the center of 
social and economic growth, where shared vision coupled with proper planning make it a critical 
element of the United States education system” (p. 1). Unlike four-year institutions, community 
colleges operate within the parameters of an open-door philosophy and rarely restricts student 
access, regardless of ability or resources (Cross, 1976). This open door-door philosophy, coupled 
with rapid enrollment growth, has placed significant pressure on institutions to maintain both 
suitable operating budgets and facilities (Lattimore, 2011).  
Following national trends, the North Carolina Community College System’s (NCCCS) 
first performance program was enacted into law in 1999 following the passage of House Bill 
168, a general appropriations bill that mandated the formal implementation of performance 
funding across all 58 NCCCS campuses (H.B. 168, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 237 [N.C. 1999]). 
Consisting of 12 performance indicators, colleges were eligible for supplemental funding 
allocations and additional budgetary flexibility if they met system-wide expectations on 6 of the 
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12 measures aimed at assessing institutional performance. This performance funding program 
was in effect for approximately 10 years, with the NCCCS beginning conversations in the fall of 
2009 to explore possible alternatives and revisions to the original program. In 2011, the North 
Carolina General Assembly directed the State Board of Community Colleges “to report on a 
revised set of accountability measures and performance standards” and asked that the report also 
include a plan “to merge revised accountability measures and performance standards into the 
regular State Aid Allocation Formula” (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013, p. 2). In 
June 2012, House Bill 950 was enacted into law, and although it was similar, the 2012 
performance funding program is noticeably different than its 1999 counterpart in two distinct 
areas (H.B. 950, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws142 [N.C. 2012]). First, while the 1999 NCCCS 
performance funding model was legislatively mandated, the 2012 model was initiated by the 
NCCCS itself and only later in conjunction with a directive from the North Carolina General 
Assembly. Second, the 1999 model was an incentive system that utilized funds to reward 
institutions in the form of bonuses on top of and in addition to standard budget allocations. The 
2012 model included performance funds as part of base budgets; failure to meet any of the 
performance measures would result in some loss of budgetary allocations by NCCCS member 
institutions.  
Statement of the Problem 
Numerous studies exist examining performance funding from a variety of lenses, 
including policy and political perspectives, yet little research exists that examines the unintended 
impacts of such programs (Dougherty et al., 2014; Hillman, Tandberg, & Fryar, 2015; Umbricht, 
Fernandez, & Ortagus, 2015). The most common unintended consequences (or results not clearly 
associated with performance funding goals) associated with performance funding include the 
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closing of programs with low graduation and job placement rates, the shortening of academic 
programs of study, the tightening of admission standards, the weakening of academic standards, 
and unreimbursed costs of compliance (Dougherty et al., 2014; Lahr, Pheatt, Dougherty, Jones, 
Natow, & Reddy, 2014). Outside that of academic leadership, such as department chairs, no 
research has been found that examines how performance funding shapes the faculty experience 
in and out of the classroom. Furthermore, existing research has shown significant gaps in the 
awareness of faculty compared to senior administrators regarding institutional performance, 
funding goals, and methods (Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2014; Reddy, Lahr, Dougherty, 
Jones, Natow, & Pheatt, 2014). Considering that most of the unintended consequences identified 
above occur at the academic level, it is troublesome that a schism exists between the awareness 
of faculty compared to that of administrators. This warrants further research to elucidate the 
faculty experience as it relates to performance funding initiatives.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative study is to examine how performance funding programs 
shape faculty experiences in and out of the classroom. Concerning the importance of examining 
the experiences of faculty as they relate to the impacts of performance funding, Lahr et al. (2014) 
state,  
it is important that we carefully examine the perspectives both of policy framers and local 
implementers, and…the perspectives of those located in different parts of the colleges 
and universities. We cannot judge the impacts of performance funding from just the 
testimony of the policy framers or even that of senior administrators at the colleges 
responding to such a policy (p. 7). 
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 Through their activities outside of the classroom, such as academic advising, registration, 
academic tutoring, committee work, curriculum creation, recruiting and marketing, and 
institutional planning, community college faculty have significant opportunities to be part of 
organizational change aimed at enacting policies and processes designed to improve overall 
institutional performance. By examining the impact of performance funding initiatives on 
faculty, we can develop a clearer picture of how organizational policies such as performance 
funding help shape the institutional culture of community colleges and thus the experiences of 
faculty.  
The overarching research question for this study is the following: How are the 
experiences of community college faculty shaped by performance funding initiatives? A sub-
question will include: From where and to what extent do faculty members receive their 
information concerning performance funding and its impact on their institution? In this study, 
performance funding will be identified as any program that rewards institutions of higher 
education for meeting system-wide established outcomes such as college transfer performance or 
student success in curriculum English.  
Significance of the Study 
While current performance funding literature suggests that faculty should be more 
involved in crafting performance funding policy, no research has been found that solely 
examines the experiences of faculty regarding performance funding and the unintended 
consequences that are a by-product of such programs. Existing research examining the 
unintended impacts of performance funding suggests that outreach on the part of performance 
funding advocates and policy makers has been tremendously successful in reaching senior level 
administrators and creating overall institutional buy-in (Dougherty et al., 2014). Faculty, 
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however, have been shown to be much less knowledgeable of both performance funding 
programs and their impacts (Dougherty et al., 2014).  
Limitations of the Study  
When utilizing interviews as part of qualitative research, Yin (2014) notes that the 
responses of interviewees are “subject to the common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or 
inaccurate articulation” (p. 113). Likewise, the use of documentation and archival records 
presents other limitations such as irretrievability, biased selectivity, reporting bias, general 
access, or accessibility due to privacy reasons (Yin, 2014). The use of data triangulation through 
conducting semi-structured interviews, collecting documentation, and observation will assist in 
reducing the limitations listed above.  
Overview of the Methodology 
Using documentation, direct observation, and semi-structured interviews, this study will 
utilize case study research for data collection purposes. Because the overarching research 
question seeks to describe how the experiences of community college are faculty shaped by 
performance funding initiatives, Yin (2014) offers that a case study is appropriate because such 
questions address “operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies 
or incidence” (p. 10). For this study, participants will be selected from institutions that receive 
performance measure allocations that exceed those of similar size institutions in enrollment and 
operating budgets. Data collection methods will include semi-structured interviews with selected 
faculty at each institution. All collected data will be organized and coded for analysis. Once 
collected data has been coded, data will be further classified into specific themes using the 




 Performance funding programs illustrate a multi-directional relationship in which 
educational systems create specific performance measures designed to produce particular 
outcomes; individual institutions develop initiatives that respond to the performance measures; 
and institutional actors, such as faculty, respond to environmental change caused by the 
institutional initiatives. Due to the use of material incentives and the creation of performance 
measures, performance funding can be viewed through the lens of principal-agent theory in that 
principals (states, policymakers, stakeholders, educational systems) seek to utilize some form of 
reward system to ensure that agents (two-year and four-year colleges and universities) meet the 
desired goals (McLendon, 2003b; Tandberg & Hillman, 2014; Tandberg, Hillman, & Barakat, 
2014). Additionally, the response of faculty to performance funding initiatives can be viewed as 
that of street-level bureaucracy (Lispsky, 1980). Lipsky (1980) describes street-level bureaucrats 
as “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their work…such 
as teachers, police officers, social workers, and healthcare workers” (p. 3). Furthermore, street-
level bureaucrats (faculty) find themselves torn by both the demands of service to those they 
serve (students) and the call for greater efficacy and efficiency of the services they provide 
(Lipsky, 1980). Finally, viewing faculty as street-level bureaucrats necessitates responses to 
performance funding to be viewed from a bottom-up policy implementation perspective. A 
bottom-up policy perspective “stresses the importance of understanding the distinct knowledge, 
goals, strategies, and activities of local actors” as they relate to policy implementation (Lahr et 
al., 2014, p. 4).  
 The use of principal-agent theory, Lipsky’s (1980) “street-level bureaucracy”, and a 
bottom-up policy implementation perspective will shed further light on the experiences of faculty 
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and provide more detailed insight regarding how faculty respond to performance measures and 
the institutional initiatives aimed at improving such measures. Due to their position on 
community college campuses, faculty are positioned to employ a tremendous degree of 
discretion as they interact daily with students and work within the framework of existing policies 
and procedures.  
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation contains five chapters. In Chapter 1, I have provided an introduction to 
the study, stated the research problem, and identified the research questions that will direct the 
development of the remainder of the study. Chapter 2 contains a review of the existing literature 
relevant to the study. Chapter 3 will further describe and explain the methodology of the study. 
Chapter 4 will discuss the results of the analysis of data. Finally, Chapter 5 will contain a 
summary of the study, conclusions, and recommendations for future research. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following review of existing literature is designed to articulate areas of concern 
regarding performance funding policies within higher education and how such policies impact 
the experiences of faculty. The first section discusses the history of performance funding in 
higher education, including the current conceptualization of performance funding models and the 
role of governors, legislative leaders, external sources, and coordinating boards. The second 
section identifies relevant theoretical frameworks for understanding the dynamics of 
performance funding implementation and subsequent impacts on faculty. The third section 
examines performance funding as policy instruments utilizing financial incentives, information 
dissemination, institutional comparison, and organizational capacity as tools to generate 
institutional response. The fourth section examines the unintended impacts of performance 
funding, which includes the weakening of academic standards and a decrease in faculty morale. 
The fifth and final section examines how faculty view and respond to initiatives such as 
performance funding.  
Over the past three decades, due to public pressure, government entities have begun 
looking for more ways to meet all of society’s needs while limiting the use of taxpayer funds 
(Liefner, 2003). Initially this applied to government services such as utilities and public safety; 
however, over time, public higher education began to bear this burden as institutions were 
viewed as implements of state policy as more and more high school graduates began to enroll in 
college (Alexander, 2000; Heller, 2000; Shin, 2010). State and federal political leaders have 
increasingly called for institutions to evaluate their educational models in an attempt to expedite 
the educational process. As noted by McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006), modern 
accountability rhetoric focuses heavily on the outcomes of institutional activity; therefore, 
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policymakers are increasingly demanding measurable performance. Every institution’s greatest 
and most measurable product is their students, and stakeholders and policy makers alike want to 
see increased outputs in the form of graduation rates, job creation, and access. In response to 
these calls, institutional systems have increasingly adopted accountability models that adopt 
performance funding as a mechanism for monitoring institutional effectiveness.  
History of Performance Funding in Higher Education 
Due to the erosion of public trust and simultaneous growth in state-level regulation and 
authority during the 1970s and 1980s, higher education experienced significant change during 
the 1990s. Known as the new accountability movement or new public management, higher 
education has experienced significant shifts in the attention paid to outcomes and the 
measurement of performance (Burke & Associates, 2005; McLendon et al., 2006; Volkwein & 
Tandberg, 2008; Zumeta, 1998). With the exception of the Morrill Act land grants in 1862, the 
federal government historically paid little attention to higher education up until the years 
following World War II (Zumeta, 1998). Elected officials during this time, as noted by Trow 
(1993), were content to simply “put the money on the stump and walk away” (p. 58).  
While most states did not begin implementing performance funding models until the 
1990s, excluding Tennessee, Ewell (2011) points out that states have been assessing student 
learning since 1986 with the initial publication of Time for Results, which was a product of the 
National Governors Association (NGA). In their report, the NGA “advocated applying the new 
techniques of collegiate assessment to public colleges and universities, both to render them more 
accountable for student learning – their most important product – and to stimulate them to 
improve” (Ewell, 2011, p. 152). During the 1990s, the accountability environment that 
encompassed higher education shifted from one focused on overall compliance and accounting 
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for expenditures to one concerned with measuring performance and accounting for results (Burke 
& Associates, 2005; Burke & Serban, 1998; Keller, 1995; McGuinness, 1995; McLendon, 
2003a; McClendon, 2003b; Volkwein, 2007; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008). Sparking this shift 
was a shrinking of government revenues while the cost of higher education continued to rise; 
this, coupled with an economic downturn, caused many states to experience budget shortfalls. 
During this same time, Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones, and Vega (2013) note that enrollments 
quickly rose due to the “baby boom echo” and an overall cultural belief that our “individual and 
collective futures” depended on college completion (p. 2). Parallel to these issues, the general 
public and business sector began to rally for improved efficiency and overall lower educational 
costs.  
While Tennessee was the first state to establish performance funding in the late 1970s, 
performance initiatives gained considerable momentum during the 1990s, with many states 
adopting some form of performance funding, and by the early 2000s most states had one or more 
performance-based accountability models (Dougherty et al., 2013; Shin, 2010). States such as 
Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, Washington, and Illinois all initiated performance funding 
programs in the 1990s. The method by which and the extent to which states chose to fund 
institutions varied greatly, as did the longevity of such models. Dougherty et al. (2013) 
illuminate this reality by noting that Tennessee and Florida are the only states to have maintained 
performance funding long term, while other states such as Missouri, South Carolina, and Illinois, 
relinquished their programs after 9 years, 7 years, and 4 years, respectively. Washington, on the 
other hand, affords an example of a state that terminated its program after a mere 2 years, only to 
create a new one in 2007. Furthermore, Florida, Illinois, and Washington (post-2007) only 
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applied their performance funding models to community colleges exclusively, while Missouri, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee applied their models to all public higher education systems.  
From a national perspective, performance funding has continued to garner significant 
attention as the focus on student completion, retention, graduation rates, and tuition rates has 
increased, most noticeably by political leaders and policy makers concerned with measures of 
accountability. In 2010, at the height of a national recession, President Barack Obama charged 
higher education with raising the proportion of Americans with college degrees. The 
administration convened the White House Summit on Community Colleges in an effort to attract 
national attention for the nation’s community colleges and invite discourse on their importance 
in “skilling up our workforce” (Bradley, 2010, p. 6). This awareness has heightened, in part, due 
to the reality that our citizenry is falling behind in obtaining higher education credentials. 
According to Friedel, Thornton, D’Amico, and Katsinas (2013), 41% of individuals aged 25-34 
in the United States possess at least an associate degree compared to 63%, 56%, 56%, and 55% 
in countries such as Korea, Canada, Japan, and the Russian Federation, respectively. Along with 
the Obama Administration, the National Governors Association and advocacy groups such as the 
Lumina Foundation increased their call for higher levels of accountability and transparency. As 
part of his 2020 initiative and the White House Completion Initiative, President Obama sought to 
increase college graduates by 5 million individuals by the year 2020 (Friedal et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the National Governors Association has recommended the use of performance 
metrics that will allow states to measure and compare themselves on items including graduation 
and transfer rates, degrees awarded, enrollment, developmental education success, retention 
rates, and credits earned. Finally, in their 2009 strategic plan, the Lumina Foundation sought to 
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increase the percentage of Americans holding high-quality degrees and credentials to 60% by 
2025 (Friedel et al., 2013). 
History of Performance Funding in the NCCCS 
The current performance funding and accountability initiatives within the NCCCS is 
rooted in legislative evolution. According to a Joint Legislative Education Oversight Committee 
report (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013), the NCCCS was one of the first higher 
education systems to begin collecting data, reporting, and publishing reports concerning success 
with the NCCCS. Labeled as the “Critical Success Factors Report,” this report eventually 
evolved into a performance based system for accountability (North Carolina Community 
Colleges, 2013). In 1997, twenty-four states began to consider some type of performance funding 
model when considering allocations for colleges and universities (Harbour, 2002). According the 
NCCCS, the State Board of Community Colleges (SBCC) began tracking its own performance 
data regarding specific measures as a means of public accountability as early as 1993 (North 
Carolina Community Colleges, 2016). In 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly passed 
legislation mandating performance funding for the 58 NCCCS colleges using 12 specific 
measures (Harbour, 2002). According to Harbour (2002), the NCCCS performance funding 
model was the product of three legislative mandates: an NCCCS accountability program, an 
NCCCS formula funding study, and a government performance audit. Since 2001, over $60 
million has been approved as “carryforward” funds and subsequently allocated to individual 
colleges using this performance funding model (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013).  
 As part of a two phase process, beginning in the fall of 2009, the SBCC and NCCCS 
President Scott Ralls started conversations to address the revision of its performance funding 
model that was enacted in the late 1990s. As part of this initiative, the state board, trustees, 
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system president, and college presidents crafted and endorsed a planning initiative titled 
“SuccessNC” (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013). Part of the task behind SuccessNC 
was to research, develop, and create performance measures aimed at “monitoring and tracking 
student progress toward completion” (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013, p. 2). As a 
performance measures committee was established and appointed in 2010, the 2011 Session of the 
North Carolina General Assembly directed the SBCC to (1) report on revised accountability 
measures and performance standards, and (2) include a plan that would merge revised 
accountability measures and performance standards into the regular “State Aid Allocation 
Formula” (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013, p. 2). 
 In November 2011, the aforementioned Performance Measures Committee brought eight 
performance measures for consideration before the SBCC. These measures were (1) basic skills 
student progress, (2) GED diploma attainment, (3) developmental student success in college-
level English courses, (4) developmental student success in college-level math courses, (5) first 
year progression, (6) curriculum completion, (7) licensure and certification attainment, and (8) 
college transfer performance (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013). The measures were 
subsequently adopted in November 2011, later reported to the Joint Legislative Oversight 
Committee in March 2012, and passed into law by the North Carolina General Assembly in June 
2012 (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013). 
 The second phase involved the creation of a revised performance based funding model. 
As part of this initiative, recommendations were accepted on incorporating performance funding 
into colleges’ regular budget allocations. As previously mentioned, under the previous 1999 
performance model, performance funds were awarded using “carryforward” funds which were 
subject to availability and/or authorization during any specific year. According to the Joint 
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Legislative Oversight Committee Report (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013), full-time 
equivalent (FTE) expenditures decreased 20% since 2007-08, while expenditures at the 
University of North Carolina System are three times higher than those of the NCCCS. As part of 
the initiative, the committee requested recurring funds equal to 2-3% to support such a 
performance based accountability model.  
 According to Jennifer Haygood, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of 
the NCCCS, during fiscal year 2013-14 the NCCCS was allocated $9 million in performance 
based funding. During fiscal year 2014-2015, the amount rose to $24 million at the direction of 
the North Carolina General Assembly (J. Haygood, personal communication, October 2013). For 
each of the eight performance measures, funds were allocated based on two factors, (1) quality 
and (2) impact. Using quality as a benchmark, funds will be allocated based on the percentage of 
students who succeed on each measure, while impact will base funds on the number of students 
who succeed on each measure (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013).  
 As part of the development of the eight newest performance measures in 2011, the 
committee created a three year review process in an effort to ensure that each performance 
measure remained both relevant and focused on improving overall student success (State Board 
of Community Colleges, 2015). In 2015, an ad hoc committee was appointed by then system 
president, Dr. Scott Ralls. According to SBCC minutes, this committee consisted of four 
institutional presidents, four members of institutional research departments, and one 
representative from the NCCCS office. As a result of the work by the ad hoc review committee, 
performance measures regarding GED diploma attainment, developmental student success in 
college-level English, and math were recommended for deletion. Subsequently, a performance 
measure examining student success rates in gateway English and math courses was added. The 
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recommendations were approved by the NCCCS Presidents Association in January 2016, 
approved by the SBCC in March 2016, and adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly 
through Section 10.1 of S.L.2016-94 (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2016). As of August 
2016, NCCCS performance measures consist of (1) basic skills student progress, (2) student 
success rate in college-level English courses, (3) student success rate in college-level math 
courses, (4) first year progression, (5) curriculum student completion, (6) licensure and 
certification passing rate, and (7) college transfer performance (North Carolina Community 
Colleges, 2016).  
As part of the overall reporting mechanism, the Performance Measures for Student 
Success Report is printed annually and serves as the NCCCS’s major accountability document 
(North Carolina Community Colleges, 2016). According to the 2016 Performance Measures for 
Student Success Report (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2016) the data included is from 
the previous year and “serves to inform colleges and the public on the performance of our 58 
community colleges” (p. 2). Information included in the report is based on three years of data 
(where available) for each measure. Baseline levels for each measure are set two standard 
deviations below the system mean, and excellence levels are set one standard deviation above the 
system mean. These benchmarks remain static throughout the course of three years and are reset 
at the conclusion of three years (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2016). The Performance 
Measures for Student Success Report has been published annually since 2014. 
Conceptualization of Performance Funding Models 
The literature shows that performance funding models take three distinct forms, 
Performance Funding, Performance Budgeting, and Performance Reporting (Burke & 
Minassians, 2002; Burke & Minassians, 2003; McLendon et al., 2006; Watson, Melancon, & 
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Kinchen, 2008). Under performance funding models, the relationship between institutional 
performance and funding is predetermined and prescriptive in nature. This model arguably is the 
most punitive, since institutions can presumably lose funding if they fail to meet the minimum 
performance benchmarks. Performance funding models seek to impact and ultimately improve 
institutional performance as it relates to what Dougherty and Reddy (2011) refer to as “ultimate” 
outcomes (p. 2). Ultimate outcomes include measurable improvements in areas such as retention, 
successfully completing key courses, credit accrual, graduation, job placement, and labor market 
responsiveness (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011).  
Using performance budgeting measures, politicians and other stakeholders are able to use 
discretion when rewarding institutions for individual performance. Likewise, McLendon et al. 
(2006) note that performance budgeting measures afford politicians an escape hatch when 
funding institutions. Politicians are able to claim credit for considering performance while not 
altering actual campus budgets. Finally, performance reporting has no direct link to resource 
allocation; however, through the use of publicity and information disbursement, institutions are 
encouraged to increase their performance (McLendon et al., 2006).  
Harbour and Nagy (2005) note that a much broader illumination of performance funding 
has emerged to include what they call the new “pluralist” conceptualization (p. 448). Under this 
conceptualization, higher education institutions have remained collectively accountable to 
politicians and other authorities for the expenditure of public funds and implementation of 
policy. However, institutions are now accountable for their performance to a much wider range 
of informal stakeholders (Behn, 2001; Harbour & Nagy, 2005; Kearns, 1998; Laanan, 2001). For 
example, Harbour (2003) notes that for community colleges particularly, these informal 
stakeholders include “students, faculty and staff, employers, four-year colleges and universities, 
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the federal government, neighborhood residents, public schools, social service agencies, and 
other individuals and organizations” (p. 301).  
Performance Funding Models: Wave 1.0 vs Wave 2.0 
The conceptualization of performance funding within academia is generally recognized 
as occurring in two waves, referred to as performance 1.0 and 2.0 programs (Albright, 2009; 
Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Snyder, 2011). The initial implementation of PF 1.0 models began 
between 1979 and 2000 and utilize funding in the form of bonuses that are in addition to regular 
funding allocations (Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2013; Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & 
Reddy, 2013; McLendon et al., 2006). Examples of PF 1.0 models include Tennessee’s model 
created in 1979 and Florida, Ohio, and Washington in 1994, 1995, and 1997, respectively 
(Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). Dougherty et al. (2014) note that PF 1.0 models historically have 
tied between 1 and 5% of funding allocations to performance outcome measures. These 
indicators include such measures as percentages of graduates, job placement, retention, 
developmental education completion, and licensure exam pass rates as measures of success for 
the subsequent awarding of bonus allocations (Burke, 2002; Dougherty, Hare, & Natow, 2009; 
Dougherty & Reddy, 2011).  
Beginning in 2007, the second wave of performance funding became operational, with 
two-thirds of all new performance funding programs being re-adoptions of previous programs 
that were discontinued in 2000 (Dougherty et al., 2014). Additionally, 40% of 2.0 programs did 
not utilize bonuses that were in addition to state budgets; rather, performance funds were 
embedded into the base operating budget of the institution (Dougherty et al., 2014). While 1.0 
programs utilized between 1 and 2% of state funds, 2.0 programs saw significantly higher 
proportions of performance dollars tied to overall budgets. Examples of these types of PF 2.0 
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models are found in newly established programs in Ohio (2009) and Tennessee (2010), in which 
institutions abandoned traditional enrollment-based funding models in four-year and two-year 
colleges (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). As illustrated by Ohio and Tennessee, models such as 
these often vary in the size of the overall proportion of funding tied to student outcomes, often 
drastically. For example, Tennessee’s and Ohio’s performance funding model accounts for 80 to 
90% of higher education funding, with the rest based on items such as utilities or equipment 
(Dougherty et al., 2014). While the creation of performance funding programs, both 1.0 and 2.0, 
have been prolific over the past 35 years, 60% of all states that have adopted such programs have 
also gone on to discontinue the same programs (Dougherty et al., 2014). Performance funding 
2.0 models continue to utilize indicators of success for ultimate outcomes, but they also place 
additional emphasis on measures of intermediate success such as course completions, 
developmental education success, completion of gateway courses such as curriculum math and 
English, and reaching credit benchmarks (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Offenstein & Shulock, 
2010).  
The rise of PF 2.0 models can be attributed to three major factors, which include the 
overall efficacy of 1.0 models, the general instability of state budgets, and external stakeholder 
endorsements (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). For some time, policymakers and elected officials 
have questioned how much reward was necessary to garner significant attention and prompt, 
swift action on the part of education leaders in order to enact institutional change (Dougherty & 
Reddy, 2011; Sanford & Hunter, 2011). By increasing the stakes of PF 2.0 models and placing 
base budgets at risk, policymakers and elected officials have spurred institutions to respond. 
Secondly, due to current economic conditions brought on by the economic recession beginning 
in 2008, many state budgets have little latitude to offer additional bonuses on top of state 
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allocation budgets (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). Finally, models in Tennessee, Ohio, and even 
Washington have received ringing endorsements from organizations such as the National 
Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, Lumina Foundation, and Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, along with increased interest perpetuated by the Obama 
Administration’s college completion agenda and Race to the Top competition (Albright, 2009; 
Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Harnisch, 2011; Snyder, 2011; Sparks & Waits, 2011; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2011).  
In separate studies of the political origins of PF 2.0 models, Dougherty et al. (2013) and 
Dougherty et al. (2014) found that the role of governors and/or legislative leaders, the role of 
external sources, and the motivation of state coordinating boards to be prominent factors in the 
creation of PF 2.0 models. States included in the 2013 study included Florida, Illinois, Missouri, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. States included in the 2014 study included 
Tennessee, Indiana, and Ohio.  
The Role of Governors and/or Legislative Leaders 
According to Dougherty et al. (2014), governors had little to do with the original 
implementation of PF 1.0 models; rather, the main stimulus for such programs originated within 
the individual higher education coordinating boards. However, as states moved towards PF 2.0 
models, governors overwhelmingly played a significant role in such development, as was the 
case in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee. In Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Washington, Dougherty et al. (2013) found that state legislators provided significant support 
for performance funding policy initiatives. Respondents found political pressure to enact such 
initiatives to be significant, as noted by a community college president in Florida when speaking 
of Senator George Kirkpatrick:  
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My sense is that without George Kirkpatrick pushing, prodding, pulling, whatever he had  
to do, legislative staff would not have had near the interest in this topic, nor would we…it 
takes the leadership of an individual oftentimes to make that happen, and Senator 
Kirkpatrick was the individual who really, really challenged us all to stop talking about 
performance funding and do something about it. (Dougherty et al., 2013, p. 11) 
At other times, political involvement was not overly explicit in demanding substantive change, 
but rather subtle in the overall timing and requests for proposals from coordinating boards. As an 
example of such involvement, Dougherty et al. (2014) found that Indiana Governor Mitch 
Daniels (2005-2013) requested the Indiana Commission for Higher Education (ICHE) to suggest 
ways to cut $150 million from higher education funding. This resulted in the development of 
funding cuts based on the institution’s performance on established indicators. Regarding how the 
cuts in 2009 resulted in the establishment of a PF 2.0 performance funding program, an Indiana 
higher education official stated,  
We got to 2011 and unfortunately we were in the same boat, with no new money and, in 
fact, more budget cuts…And then we got to 2011-2013 and guess what, still no money. 
And so the base-reallocation is being used, it appears as though it has sort of grown a 
history of its own. (Dougherty et al., 2014, p. 26)  
Similarly, in Ohio, Governor Ted Strickland (2007-2011) spearheaded the passage of HB 
119 in 2007 which mandated the development of a 10-year strategic plan for higher education 
that would include an examination of the state’s role in subsidizing higher education funding 
(Dougherty et al., 2014). As a result, in an effort to “get ahead of any criticism,” institutions were 
convinced that it was in their best interests to design their own performance funding system 
22 
  
(Dougherty et al., 2014, p. 27). However, the ultimate design of the funding model was crafted 
by administrative staff. Chancellor of Higher Education Eric Fingerhut wrote  
Vice Chancellor of Finance Richard Petrick and his capable staff sat down with the chief 
financial officers of each institution to work on the technical aspects of the 
formula….revising the formula until the CFOs became confident that they understood the 
system and that it was fair as possible given the different types of institutions that 
formula covered. (Dougherty et al., 2004, p. 28)  
In Tennessee, Governor Phil Bredesen (2003-2011) echoed actions in Indiana and Ohio 
by asking the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) for ideas concerning changes to 
higher education funding policy. In response, a Tennessee higher education official offered: 
For several years now we had been thing about how to design the funding policy to be 
better than it was. And so we were kind of thinking about being more productive as a 
state, and trying to encourage more institutional productivity. …And so we were 
beginning to think about how we’d make a funding formula that does that as well. 
(Dougherty et al., 2014, p. 30) 
Additionally, while Governor Bredesen was influential in the design of the PF 2.0 model in 
Tennessee, his influence also led to the advancement of a much larger program than originally 
envisioned. Dougherty et al. (2014) found that the governor’s reaction spurred program growth 
as noted by a higher education official who stated, “I think it would have been more incremental 
in maybe moving performance funding from 5% to 7% or something, but it wouldn’t have gone 




External sources appear to have been a driving force behind PF 2.0 models in Tennessee, 
Ohio, and Indiana. All three states developed PF 2.0 models with assistance from outside 
organizations such as the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, Complete 
College America (which is aided by other organizations such as the Gates and Lumina 
Foundations), and other initiatives by the Lumina Foundation such as Achieving the Dream, and 
Making Opportunity Affordable (Dougherty et al., 2014).  
The Lumina Foundation has been particularly influential in the creation and support of 
performance funding in Ohio, Tennessee, and Indiana. In Tennessee, Lumina sponsored the 
Making Opportunity Affordable initiative which provided significant support for performance 
funding and led to the THEC to hire the National Center for Higher Education Management 
Systems (NCHEMS) to conduct audits of the state’s higher education policies (Dougherty et al., 
2014). The audits eventually led to an additional performance metric that examined funding 
based on enrollments at the end of the semester as opposed to two to three weeks into the 
semester. The Lumina Foundation also funded HCM Associates to assist the THEC with the 
creation and implementation of the Complete College Tennessee Act. HCM Associates would 
also later serve as an appointee on the funding formula committee appointed by the THEC 
(Dougherty et al., 2014).  
Dougherty et al. (2014) found similar actions in both Indiana and Ohio as well. In each 
state, HCM Associates were funded to provide strategical support for performance funding 
initiatives. In Indiana, HCM Associates sponsored discussions with the Indiana Commission for 
Higher Education (ICHE) and provided key research which tied directly to the 2012 ICHE 
strategic plan. Similarly, in Ohio, HCM personnel served as facilitators on the Community 
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College Funding Consultation which also included members of the Ohio Association of 
Community College, the Ohio Board of Regents, and the Ohio Office of Budget and 
Management (Dougherty et al., 2014).  
Coordinating Boards 
Finally, in both studies, coordinating boards for higher education were found to be 
involved in the creation of both PF 1.0 and 2.0 funding models; however, their motivation 
changed between the two enactments (Dougherty et al., 2014). During the original 
implementation of PF 1.0 programs, coordinating boards viewed performance funding simply as 
a new funding source in the midst of already constrained budgets. By the time PF 2.0 models 
were implemented, coordinating boards no longer were interested in increasing public funds. 
Today, coordinating boards appear to be, in light of growing demand from external sources, 
largely concerned with generating responsiveness from higher education institutions in 
producing more graduates and greater efficiency in the use of state allocations and resources 
(Dougherty et al., 2014). 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Principal-agent theory originally arose out of the study of economies but has since seen 
several other iterations, most noticeably in the field of political science. At its very core, 
principal-agent theory offers that principals (policymakers, educational systems, states, and 
stakeholders) utilize reward systems in an effort to guarantee that agents (in this case colleges 
and universities) strive to meet the desired goals of the overarching organization. In an 
interesting dynamic, academic institutions serve as both principals and agents when discussing 
performance funding policies due to the multi-directional aspect of performance funding models. 
On one hand, academic institutions act as agents as they respond to larger policy mandates 
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through the creation of campus-wide initiatives aimed at improving institutional performance. 
On the other hand, as institutions create such initiatives, they begin to operate as principals as the 
campus initiatives are handed down to faculty for implementation. Institutions, while acting as 
the principal, have significant interests in securing compliant behavior from agents (faculty) that 
result in improved performance and subsequently result in increased monetary incentives. It is at 
this point that principal-agent theory and street-level bureaucracy begin to merge as the agents 
(faculty) may resist the initiatives or demands of the principals (institution) due to a conflict of 
values or interests (Lahr et al., 2014). Viewing individual institutions as principals and their 
faculty as both agents and street-level bureaucrats allows performance funding policy to be 
examined from a bottom-up policy perspective. Bottom-up policy perspectives do not view local 
divergence from overall policy goals as implementation failure, but rather as an adaptation on the 
part of local implementers to merge broader policy mandates with local realities (Honig, 2006; 
Lahr et al., 2014; Smith & Larimer, 2009).  
Principal-Agent Theory 
Multiple studies have examined performance funding using principal-agent theory 
(Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty et al., 2016; Lahr et al., 2014; Pheatt, Lahr, Dougherty, 
Jones, Natow, & Reddy, 2014). Dougherty et al. (2016) offer that performance funding 
initiatives generally employ the use of policy instruments which McDonnell and Elmore (1987) 
referred to as “mechanisms that translate substantive policy goals into concrete actions” (p. 134). 
Principal-agent theory allows us to view the unintended impacts of performance funding as part 
of a larger accountability systems dynamic. Lahr et al. (2014) posit that if we view colleges as 
“political systems with power conflicts,” we can see the unintended impacts from performance 
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funding as both the result of miscommunication, poor expertise, and inadequate resources, and 
from the differences in viewpoints, goals, and interests (p. 7).  
Principal-agent theory has been used to study a variety of issues such as function of the 
firm or to explain political phenomena and political control of bureaucracy (McClendon, 2003a). 
McClendon (2003b) noted that principals and agents are both actors with individual self-interests 
whose preferences often differ. This divergence in self-interests is what Moe (1987) referred to 
as the “agency problem” in which “the principal tries to control the behavior of his agent, but the 
agent is driven by his own interests” (p. 480). McClendon (2003a) added that these two 
conditions combined necessitate the need for principals to monitor and control the behaviors of 
agents. From a theoretical framework, principal-agent relationships can be applied to a wide 
array of examples including, but not limited to, employer-employee, buyer-supplier, and other 
agency-level relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989; Harris & Raviv, 1978). In the case of performance 
funding, principal-agent theory posits that principals (states, policymakers, stakeholders, or 
educational systems) seek to utilize some form of reward system to ensure that agents (two-year 
and four-year colleges and universities) meet the desired goals (McLendon, 2003b; Tandberg & 
Hillman, 2014; Tandberg et al., 2014). In its most simplistic form, principal-agent theory 
assumes the existence of conflict between principal and agent, outcomes that are easily 
measurable, and agents who are opposed to risk more so than their principals (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, this model is further complicated when principal and/or agent disagree on individual 
policy goals, when agents face multiple principals, or when incentives force increased 
transaction costs (Tandberg & Hillman, 2014; Tandberg et al., 2014).  
 Tandberg et al. (2014) suggests that principal-agent theory is particularly useful in 
addressing challenges institutions may face when attempting to respond to incentives put in place 
27 
  
by principals. McDonnell and Elmore’s (1987) use of value, for example, can refer to programs 
addressing particular clientele or tangible objects such as compensatory education for 
disadvantaged students or facilities upgrade. Through the lens of performance funding, items of 
value include, but are not limited to, increased graduation rates or improved retention and 
success rates for students. Because of the conditional nature of inducements, distribution usually 
coincides with increased regulations that help assure funds are used in a manner that is consistent 
with the principal’s intent. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) attribute these additional rules to the 
increased transactional costs experienced by the implementing agency in the form of 
“unreimbursed administrative expenses, matching requirements, and avoidance costs designed to 
mitigate the effect of undesirable conditions on the transfer of money or authority” (p. 139).  
Bottom-Up Policy Implementation 
Policy implementation studies originally focused largely on national programs and why 
such programs often deviated from the policy as originally intended by the policy framers (Lahr 
et al., 2014; Schofield, 2001). This perspective was known as the top-down approach and 
assumed that policy implementation originates with policy or legislative objectives, and that 
implementation processes follow in a linear fashion (Schofield, 2001). The top-down approach to 
policy implementation views deviations from larger policy initiatives as a result of ambiguous 
policy goals, a lack of capacity or resources at the local level, or a general lack of good will by 
local implementers (Lahr et al., 2014). Furthermore, top-down theorists viewed local actors or 
street-level bureaucrats as antagonists towards the original intentions of policy and completely 
disregard their role as “interpreters of central policy” (Sabatier, 1986; Schofield, 2001, p. 251). 
According to the work of Elmore (1979), Hanf (1982), and Hjern and Hull (1982), top-down 
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theorists view policymakers and their policies as the key actors while neglecting the response of 
street-level bureaucrats or local officials.  
In response to the inability of top-down writers to reconcile the role of street-level 
involvement in the implementation of policy, bottom-up theorists focused their efforts on (1) the 
actions of the local actors as opposed to policymakers, (2) the nature of the problem for which 
policy has been created, and (3) the motives and actions of actors as they respond to the policy 
(Schofield, 2001). Bottom-up policy theorists argue that it is equally important to acknowledge 
that local implementers often have differing goals than those of the policymakers (Lahr et al., 
2014; Matland, 1995). Sabatier (1986) offers that early bottom-up theorists disregarded the 
traditional hallmarks of policy such as formulation, implementation, and reformulation, and 
instead focused on the actions of local actors.  
Policy implementation, such as that of performance funding, occurs at both the macro 
and micro levels (Berman, 1978; Matland, 1995). At the macro-level, policymakers craft new 
initiatives or programs designed to address identified areas of concern. At the micro-level, 
organizations create their own programs designed to respond to macro initiatives imposed upon 
them by policymakers and governing bodies (Matland, 1995). Berman (1978) suggests that 
problems involving the implementation of new policy initiatives often occur due to the 
interaction of the policy with the micro-level institutional setting. This especially applies to 
policies such as performance funding in which the policy is crafted at the national or state level 
and passed down to participating institutions that widely vary in size, resources, and location. 
Under these conditions, the role of local actors becomes critically important as individual 
institutions respond to such sweeping policy. According to the bottom-up perspective “if local 
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implementers are not given the freedom to adapt the program to local conditions it is likely to 
fail” (Matland, 1995, p. 148).  
Performance Funding as Policy Instruments  
The use of mechanisms such as performance funding is what McDonnell and Elmore 
(1987) refer to as alternative policy instruments. The purposes of these instruments are to be the 
catalyst for transforming policy goals such as increased graduation rates, into tangible actions. 
Historically, policy instruments consisted of ideas and practices such as regulations, rights, 
grants, technical assistance, and loans. However, McDonnell and Elmore (1987) broadened the 
range of instruments to include mandates and inducements and define them as follows: mandates 
are the rules and governance of individuals and are intended to produce compliance; and 
inducements involve the transfer of money to individual actors or agencies in exchange for 
desired actions. Furthermore, in their purest form, mandates do not involve the transfer of funds 
or resources as an incentive for compliance. Opposite of mandates, inducements as a form of 
procurement, empowers agencies to transfer funds, resources, or authority to other agencies in 
exchange for something of value (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).  
McDonnell and Elmore (1987) offer that mandates and inducements differ in three very 
distinct ways: First, mandates involve the use of coercion to elicit desired performance, while 
inducements involve the transfer of funds or resources as a condition of desired performance. 
Secondly, compliance is a desired outcome while using mandates; however, outcomes are 
measured through the production of value while using inducements. Thirdly, mandates assume 
that required actions are expected of agencies and should be carried out regardless of the 
agencies’ own abilities and resources, whereas inducements, through the transfer of funds and 
resources, acknowledge the variation in individual agencies’ abilities through the elicitation of 
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performance. The use of inducements has long been used as a tactic by policy makes to elicit 
desired outcomes from various state agencies. For example, Washington legislators supporting a 
performance funding program between 1997-1999 were viewed to believe “in the notion we tend 
to get more of what the funding structure responds to, so what is incentivized and measured and 
funded, we tend to get more of and less of the other things” (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011, p. 2). 
Likewise, a legislative advocate in Florida was described as believing “you could get 
performance altered by money. If you put a pot of money out there, people would change their 
behavior in order to chase that money” (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011, p. 2).  
While performance funding initiatives are a type of policy instrument designed to act as a 
catalyst to improve particular outcomes (such as first-year progression or graduation rates), such 
initiatives rarely come with prescribed institutional instructions for implementation. Instead, the 
creation and use of such policy instruments is designed to spark action and promote institutional 
change. Dougherty et al. (2016) identified four specific policy instruments that are most often 
employed by policy makers as a means to achieve desired outcomes: (1) Financial incentives, (2) 
Information dissemination, (3) Comparison with other institutions, and (4) Capacity building. All 
of these are employed in typical performance funding programs.  
Financial Incentives 
 The use of financial incentives garners the most attention when discussing performance 
funding due to the reality that many institutions, specifically community colleges, frequently face 
lean budgets. When applied to higher education, a financial incentives theory of action is similar 
to that of resource dependency theory in proposing that institutions will seek to maximize their 
revenue by improving their performance when the available funding is significant enough 
(Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In their study of both 
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community colleges and four-year institutions in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee, Dougherty et al. 
(2016) found that 60% of the 141 institutional respondents capable of discussing budgetary 
matters believed their particular state’s performance funding program had little to no impact on 
their institutions budget, yet nearly half of the institutional respondents felt performance 
incentives had substantial impacts on campus wide efforts to improve student outcomes. In the 
same study, a mid-level administrator stated “I think it does have a big impact. And I think it 
establishes sort of officially that this is the business that we’re in, and we always should have 
been in this business” (Dougherty et al., 2016, p. 154). In a review of findings from performance 
funding studies that included Florida, Tennessee, Washington, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, 
and South Carolina, Dougherty and Reddy (2011) found the impact of performance funding to be 
mixed among participants. For example, an administrator at an institution in Tennessee stated, 
“The state subsidy that comes as a result of whatever few points you get or do not get is not 
significant enough to make us do what we ought to be doing” (Tanner, 2005, p. 83). While 
another administrator at a different Tennessee institution which received $700,000 in 
performance funding stated, “It’s not a lot of money, but it was like manna from Heaven and 
that’s money we would not have had” (Lorber, 2001, p. 82). In their examination of both four-
year institutions and community colleges, Natow, Pheatt, Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, and Reddy 
(2014) found performance funding to have “at least a medium-sized influence” on the adoption 
of campus-wide efforts designed to spur improvement on performance measures (p. 59). 
Similarly, Harbour and Nagy (2005) found that three of four low-performing community 
colleges in North Carolina made significant organizational changes in staffing and programmatic 
areas due to state performance ratings.  
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Information Dissemination  
 Along with financial incentives, the use of information dissemination is frequently used 
as a catalyst for institutional change. With performance models in mind, policy makers share 
goals and intended methods with campus leaders and faculty as a means to facilitate buy-in 
(Dougherty et al., 2016; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). It is here that specific performance 
measures are identified along with system-wide goals, targets, and baselines. Through the use of 
public reports, policy makers are able to publicly acknowledge successes and failures, and 
institutions are able to evaluate their performance on each of the performance measures. The 
presentation of information is such that its goal to legitimize and validate the overall 
performance funding model so that institutions believe it is socially necessary.  
In their study of both community colleges and four-year institutions in Indiana, Ohio, and 
Tennessee, Dougherty et al. (2016) found all three states had participated in communication 
efforts designed to share the overall goals and methods of their performance funding programs. 
Information was shared with local college personnel either directly by state agents or through 
senior college administrators. However, 38 of 222 respondents, concentrated among faculty and 
middle management, indicated they had not received any communication concerning the goals 
and methods of performance funding. In a review of findings from performance funding studies 
that included Florida, Tennessee, Washington, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and South 
Carolina, Dougherty and Reddy (2011) found evidence of similar voids of knowledge on the part 
of middle management and faculty.  
The literature indicates that there is a divide between administrators and faculty regarding 
overall awareness of state performance priorities. Dougherty et al. (2016) offer that this lack of 
awareness is due to demands placed on faculty, lack of faculty involvement in decision-making 
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matters concerning performance funding issues, and withholding information deemed irrelevant 
to faculty.  
Institutional Comparison 
Along with the use of financial incentives and information dissemination, policy makers 
and advocates of performance funding use institutional comparison as a tool to spur change. The 
literature delineates differences between institutional awareness of overall state priorities and 
increased awareness of an institution’s own performance. Through publicly available 
comparisons, institutions are openly compared to sister institutions on each of the available 
performance measures. The intent of these comparisons is to generate local feelings of pride and 
encourage the attainment of status (Burke & Associates, 2005; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; 
Dougherty et al., 2016). However, Dougherty et al. (2016) found that a third (79 of 221) of 
institutional respondents indicated there was no direct or indirect communication from the state 
regarding their institutions’ performance, and that comparison efforts were less effective than 
information dissemination and financial incentives in spurring institutional actions, with only 
51% of respondents rating its impact as high. 
Organizational Capacity 
 Finally, while performance funding initiatives have created new demands on the part of 
academic institutions, little attention has been paid to the ability of such institutions abilities to 
respond. The capacity of each institution to respond varies across campuses and according to 
available resources and according to each institutions willingness to do so. Performance funding 
programs are designed so that they identify colleges’ weaknesses and incentivize improvement. 
However, Dougherty et al. (2016) found that 95% of respondents rated the use of capacity 
building as a policy instrument as low or non-existent. Furthermore, Dougherty et al. (2016) 
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concludes colleges are being identified as low performing on a myriad of performance measures, 
while lacking the resources to identify solutions, pay for the cost of interventions, and to evaluate 
their effectiveness. 
 Each of the aforementioned policy instruments, either together or separate, ultimately 
lead to the immediate intended impacts sought by policymakers. By design, these impacts 
“stimulate intermediate institutional changes involving changes to institutional policies, 
programs, and practices…such as more graduates or increased rates of job placement” 
(Dougherty et al., 2016, p. 149). The use of these policy instruments in an effort to produce the 
intended impacts also leads to the creation of larger unforeseen obstacles and other widespread 
unintended impacts that are often the side-effects of such initiatives.  
Unintended Impacts 
Performance funding models typically consist of explicit measureable outcomes such as 
improved graduation rates, first-year progression, licensure exam pass rates, or student success in 
curriculum math and English. However, performance funding models, despite the best intentions 
on the part of policy framers, often produce impacts not originally intended by policymakers 
(Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Lahr et al., 2014; Moynihan, 2008; 
Umbricht et al., 2015). This is due in large part to the reality that performance funding models 
often ask institutions to improve or respond to measures that are largely out of their control. 
Umbricht et al. (2015) offer that performance measures and subsequent outcomes are often 
predicted by student backgrounds and experiences long before students ever step foot on college 
campuses. Umbricht et al. (2015) add that as a result of these complex relationships, higher 
education professionals may “try to comply with the letter but not the spirit of performance 
funding law” resulting in unintended performance funding impacts (p. 647).  
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Studies by Lahr et al. (2014), Dougherty et al. (2013), Dougherty et al. (2016) found the 
costs of compliance, narrowing of institutional missions, restriction of student admissions, 
institutional cooperation, decrease in staff morale, weaker faculty voice in academic governance, 
and grade inflation and weakening of academic standards to be common unintended impacts 
identified by respondents in the states they studied. Each of the aforementioned studies 
differentiated unintended impacts as either actual/observed or anticipated/potential/perceived. 
Moving forward, particular interest will be given to unintended impacts that are directly tied to 
the faculty experience and reflect their individualized actions inside the classroom, participation 
in shared governance, and overall morale.  
Weakened Academic Standards 
Previous studies by Lahr et al. (2014), Dougherty et al. (2013), Dougherty et al. (2016), 
and Dougherty and Hong (2006) offer that academic standards are weakened through a variety of 
practices including grade inflation, reduction in degree requirements, and reduction of the overall 
time spent in developmental education. Performance metrics that heavily weigh institutional 
performance in areas such as student completion, academic progress, or success in specific 
curriculum courses risk the weakening of academic standards as institutions try to meet such 
benchmarks. In interviews conducted at nine public four-year colleges and nine community 
colleges across Tennessee, Ohio, and Indiana, Lahr et al. (2014) found 29 respondents who 
identified the weakening of academic standards as potential unintended impact, while three 
others identified it as an actual impact. Similarly, Dougherty and colleagues (2016) found 60 
respondents at both community colleges and four-year institutions that identified the weakening 
of academic standards as an unintended impact with one-third of those indicating it was already 
occurring. In Indiana, where student completions are the most heavily weighted performance 
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metric within the funding formula, one interviewee stated, “It’s putting faculty in a position of 
the easiest way out is to lower the standards and get people through. And so it’s something that’s 
of great concern I think” (Lahr et al., 2014, p. 25). Similarly, a faculty member in Ohio stated: 
Well, in an effort to promote student success, there is a substantial pressure to minimize 
the failure rates of the students in some of these undergraduate courses. And of course 
that would translate into inflation of grades in order to make sure that the students are 
passing all of these courses and so forth. So I as a faculty member have a concern as to 
the watering down of our course materials as well as quality of our majors, the programs 
(Lahr et al., 2014, p. 27).  
In Dougherty and Hong (2006), community college faculty in Texas reported having to account 
for each student who dropped their course through the use of a written report that identified steps 
taken by the faculty to prevent the student withdrawal. This sentiment was echoed by the 
president of the American Association of University Professors chapter at a Florida college: 
There’s a lot of pressure to retain every single student no matter what it takes. So 
implicitly does this then push faculty towards grade inflation and that sort of thing?  
…In reality there’s no other way to achieve what their goals are…and we’re evaluated 
based on that. We have to report every conference we’ve had, the outcome, if the student 
wasn’t retained, why, how many efforts were made (Dougherty & Hong, 2006, p. 75).  
Similar faculty concerns appear in research conducted by Jenkins, Ellwein, and Boswell (2009) 
examining community colleges in Washington State and the new Student Achievement Initiative 
created in 2007. Faculty and administrator participants both indicated that they feared faculty 
would experience pressure to lower their academic standards in order to pass more students.  
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Likewise, across all three states in the study, respondents expressed concerns with the 
removal of barriers that hindered paths to graduation while focusing heavily on credentials such 
as certificates. While ensuring that timely student graduation was viewed as a positive step, there 
was also fear among the respondents that practices such as these negatively impact learning by 
creating a culture in which students rush hurriedly through their studies as opposed to focusing 
on the experience of college and their whole education as students (Lahr et al., 2014).  
Faculty Morale & Their Role in Shared Governance 
 Perhaps the final two examples of unintended impacts are best examined independently 
of each other. The instances of lowered faculty morale and diminished faculty voice in shared 
governance are drastically fewer across all of the studies reviewed for this section. Nonetheless, 
faculty morale suffers as greater emphasis is placed on the poor results of performance funding 
metrics. Likewise, as noted by Dougherty and Reddy (2011), if faculty members are unaware of 
performance funding and the extent to which it impacts their campuses, they are much less likely 
to actively help shape how their college responds. When faculty are uninvolved in the 
institutional response to performance funding policies, it undermines the role of the faculty voice 
in shared governance and creates greater possibility for institutional responses that are either 
ineffective or perpetuate greater unintended impacts (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011).  
Across all respondents located in Tennessee, Ohio, and Indiana, 11 respondents indicated 
they had observed a decrease in faculty and staff morale (Lahr et al., 2014). One faculty member 
responded, “The implication from this type of funding is that we’re not working hard enough, 
we’re not willing to change, and we’re not willing to improve. We’re not willing to look at what 
we do and try and do better” (Lahr et al., 2014, p. 35). In the same study, an administrator at an 
Indiana institution stated that performance funding continually brings poor results to the attention 
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of the faculty and that “it’s demoralizing….They’re underappreciated” (Lahr et al., 2014, p. 35). 
In addition to lowered morale due to the continuous notification of lackluster results or failure, 
faculty are also concerned with a perceived loss of communal voice in shared governance. While 
Lahr et al. (2014) acknowledge that there were few mentions of loss of faculty voice in shared 
governance, it should still be considered a very important unintended impact. As the collective 
faculty voice on college campuses goes, so goes the ability to voice concerns against those 
unintended impacts previously mentioned.  
Across all studies reviewed, instances of faculty identifying diminished voice in shared 
governance were generally classified as “few.” However, in response to performance funding 
being used to criticize faculty, a faculty member in Ohio stated “There’s been a strong sense that 
this discourse has been used to sort of marginalize and excoriate faculty” (Lahr et al., 2014, p. 
35). Furthermore, the degree to which performance funding impacts the relative power of faculty 
is lacking in the literature (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Lahr et al., 2014). While Lahr et al. 
(2014) did find instances of faculty stating they would strongly oppose campus policies or 
initiatives that would weaken their academic standards, it is worth questioning how effective any 
opposition would be if indeed faculty voice in shared governance is reduced.  
Faculty Response 
 As addressed in previous sections of this literature review, faculty have been shown to be 
less informed than campus administrators regarding performance funding policies, and such 
policies erode faculty participation in shared governance. Such findings present faculty as merely 
passive actors and adaptive to the instructions of the institution and performance funding 
measures. However, it is appropriate to examine whether faculty actually respond to such 
initiatives and, if so, how their response manifests across the institution. While scarce research 
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has looked specifically at the response of faculty in regards to performance funding initiatives, 
Lipsky’s (1980) examination of public service workers as street-level bureaucrats and Scott’s 
(1985, 1986, 1990) examination of resistance of authority by subordinate groups offer an 
excellent lens through which to view faculty response to such initiatives. In addition, other 
research concerning faculty-administrator chasms, administrative tasks, and decision making will 
be discussed. 
Street-Level Bureaucracy 
College faculty were not included in Lipsky’s (1980) original work examining public 
service workers as street-level bureaucrats. College faculty, however, are appropriately 
positioned as frontline employees specifically tasked with interacting with the citizens (students) 
of the institution. Lipsky (1980) observed that policy makers often impose mandates or policies 
without fully comprehending the complex realities of such legislation on those responsible for 
implementing it. Furthermore, while acknowledged as professionals in their respective field, 
Lipsky (1980) offers that street-level bureaucrats have tremendous discretion in how they will 
carry out such legislation. Using Lipsky’s (1980) framework, it is at this intersection of policy 
and response that college faculty, acting as street-level bureaucrats, become policy makers in 
their own right as they exercise discretion in decisions concerning their citizens (students) and 
exercise autonomy from organizational authority. 
According to Lipsky (1980), lower-level workers generally accept formal structures of 
authority within organizations due to an overall cooperative mindset. This is due to the reality 
that lower-level workers acknowledge the legitimacy of any formal authority and that workers 
typically are not in a position to dissent. However, this arrangement can quickly change to reflect 
general non-compliance when lower-level workers’ “interests” are different than or opposed to 
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those of the organization, and any available incentives or sanctions are deemed insufficient 
(Lipsky, 1980, p. 17). Once lower-level employees perceive their interests to differ from those of 
superiors or the organization, Lipsky (1980) suggests that these street-level bureaucrats will 
begin to withhold their cooperation through practices such as not reporting to work; hostility 
towards the organization in the form of cheating, stealing, or waste; or alienation and apathy. 
Furthermore, not all street-level bureaucrats within a particular organization have similar 
interests. According to Lipsky (1980) “Certain features of their role make it possible for them to 
make these differences manifest” (p. 18). This thought aligns itself well with higher education 
institutions, particularly community colleges, in which there are constrained budgets and a 
variety of academic divisions with differing goals and student populations. Faculty, acting as 
street-level bureaucrats, see policy initiatives such as performance measures as attacks on their 
profession, autonomy, and particular areas of expertise.  
Faculty, acting as street-level bureaucrats, serve as policymakers when responding to 
legislation or campus initiatives that were created above them by state legislatures or campus 
administrators. While performance funding measures are broadly defined, it is the responsibility 
of the individual institutions to craft their own response to such measures. Additionally, 
individual performance measures may be very general to the campus at large (first-year student 
progression), while others are very specific (student completion in math & English). While 
campus administrators may enact campus policies designed to respond to and improve such 
measures, street-level bureaucracy suggests that faculty have tremendous discretion in how they 
apply the policy, adapt it to their immediate situation, or ignore it altogether (Lipsky, 1980; 
Malak, 2015). Resistance to such performance measures may occur when faculty feel the 
measures are too intrusive, perceived to be unfair, or undermine their role as a faculty member. 
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Similar thoughts concerning resistance by subordinates was identified by Scott (1985, 1986) 
when he wrote about the peasant people in Malay. Scott (1985) identifies the “struggle over 
values – the ideological struggle” as the foundation for any resistance that occurs due to lack of 
morality, fairness, or perceived threat to norms and values. Scott (1990) also used the term 
“infrapolitics” to describe subordinate resistance “that avoids any open declaration of its 
intentions” (p. 220).  
It is not entirely clear how community college faculty may apply forms of resistance 
considering that many of the changes brought forth by performance funding happen at the 
institutional level. Efforts to shorten programs of study or limit the time spent in pre-curriculum 
classes do not readily provide faculty with opportunities to resist such practices. Echoing similar 
thoughts as Scott (1990), Thomas and Davies (2005) state that “resistance is understood as a 
constant process of adaption, subversion, and re-inscription of dominant discourses” (p. 687).  
Likewise, long before performance funding initiatives, college faculty have been responding to 
the realities of campus bureaucracy and other efforts to mandate campus accountability and 
efficiency. 
Matters of Accountability and Efficiency  
 With the rise of Ewell’s (1998) culture of accountability institutions of higher education 
are regularly involved in greater internal planning and continuous improvement efforts that often 
directly impact and expand the primary tasks of educators. According to Wimsatt, Trice, and 
Langley (2009), faculty have increasingly been asked to advance new technologies in their 
teaching, be more available to their students and campus through email and other digital 
solutions, participate in increased assessment, and effectively teach diverse student populations.  
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 Research has shown that faculty tends to identify activities such as assessment and other 
accountability initiatives as merely intrusions against their autonomy and added inconveniences 
in already busy schedules. Additionally, faculty has been shown to be suspicious of overall 
institutional effectiveness activities, and they possess a general distrust of the administrative 
hierarchy (Birnbaum, 1988; Volkwein & Malik, 1997; Welsh & Metcalf, 2003). In their study of 
faculty support for institutional effectiveness activities, Welsh and Metcalf (2003) found that 
while they are presented as “common sense appeals” by administrators, faculty often see them as 
(1) attacks on tenure and academic freedom, (2) attempts to reduce faculty lines, (3) selling out 
to business ideologies, and (4) caving in to bureaucracy (p. 448). From afar, academic 
institutions appear to be harbors of consensus, with administrators and faculty members working 
in unison towards common goals. However, research suggests that this is often not the case and 
outright difficult to achieve. Campbell and Slaughter (1999) offer that “some tension between 
faculty and administrators has been accepted as an enduring part of academic life” (p. 310). 
Much of this tension is rooted in the opposing perspectives of administrators and faculty. 
According to Walsh and Metcalf (2003), the proclivity of administrators to interact with external 
stakeholders makes them remarkably more receptive than faculty to the external aspirations of 
the academy and much more likely to view the institution as revolving around external forces 
which have tremendous impact on the continued vitality of the institution.  
Summary 
In summary, this review of relevant literature has illuminated the continuously evolving 
nature of performance funding throughout higher education. Likewise, the literature has shown 
that performance funding policies act as significant policy instruments aimed at creating change 
and overall campus improvement. While the literature has examined performance funding from a 
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myriad of lenses, there exists a significant gap in examining how it shapes the experiences of 
faculty in and out of the classroom. Viewing faculty as street-level bureaucrats operating within 
the principal-agent dynamic and performance funding from a bottom-up policy perspective will 
allow further examination of faculty as either passive recipients of such policy instruments or 
perhaps as tools of resistance. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
 The purpose of this chapter is to present the research methodology used to examine how 
performance funding programs shape faculty experiences in and out of the classroom. 
Performance funding is identified as any program that rewards institutions of higher education 
for meeting system-wide established outcomes such as college transfer performance or student 
success in curriculum English. In addition to their responsibilities as in-class instructors, faculty 
participate in activities outside the classroom, such as academic advising, registration, academic 
tutoring, committee work, curriculum creation, recruiting and marketing, and institutional 
planning. For this study, participants will be selected from community colleges that represent the 
bottom 25% and middle 50% in student enrollment across the North Carolina Community 
College System. As shown in chapter two, institutional funding and organizational capacity have 
significant impacts on an institution’s ability to respond to initiatives such as performance 
funding (Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Smaller to average 
sized institutions face lower student enrollment and operating budgets than large schools. This 
research will utilize an embedded comparative case study. Topics in this chapter include: (a) 
design of the study, (b) setting of the study, (c) selecting sites to study, (d) sites of the study, (e) 
sample selection, (f) data collection methods, (g) data analysis, (h) validity and reliability, and (i) 
limitations.  
Design of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate how performance funding initiatives shape the 
experiences in and out of classrooms of community college faculty. Therefore, a comparative 
case study meets the needs of the study. Yin (2014) identifies case studies as appropriate when 
research questions ask how or why, the extent of control the researcher has over behavioral 
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events is limited, and there exists a focus on contemporary events. The overarching research 
question for this study is the following: How are the experiences of community college faculty 
shaped by performance funding initiatives? A sub-question will include: From where and to what 
extent do faculty members receive their information concerning performance funding and its 
impact on their institution?  
Setting of the Study: North Carolina Community College System 
 The North Carolina Community College System (NCCCS) was chosen as the setting for 
this study due to its notable past and present concerning performance funding models. There has 
been some form of performance funding model at work within the NCCCS since 1999, with the 
most recent iteration beginning in 2012. In 2010, the NCCCS, in conjunction with the SBCC, the 
NCCCS president, the North Carolina Association of Community College Presidents, and the 
North Carolina Association of Community College Trustees, began implementation of a new 
student success initiative entitled “SuccessNC” (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013). 
The SuccessNC initiative identified two specific goals: (1) increase student access and program 
excellence while leading to student success and (2) create performance measures that monitor 
student progress towards completion (North Carolina Community Colleges, 2013). Performance 
funding within the NCCCS became inextricably coupled to SuccessNC as the newly created 
2012 performance measures were tied to individual SuccessNC initiatives while tracking 
institutional and system metrics beginning with the first Performance Measures for Student 
Success report that was released in July 2013 (Brown & Spies, 2015). While the original 
framework and initiatives of SuccessNC were created two years prior to the current performance 
funding model, many of the initiatives were utilized as performance measures, thus impacting a 
wide range of academic areas across campuses. During fiscal year 2013-2014, $9 million in 
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performance funds were allocated to North Carolina community colleges, with this amount 
increasing to $24 million during 2014-2015.  
 The North Carolina Community College System consists of 58 individual institutions, 
enrolls more than 700,000 students annually, and is the third largest system of higher education 
in the United States (North Carolina General Assembly, 2016). In spite of its overall size and 
diversity, each individual community college within the NCCCS operates with a tremendous 
amount of autonomy and flexibility. Each of the 58 North Carolina community colleges is 
governed by an individual board of trustees and institutional president, with each institution 
receiving leadership from the system office concerning new initiatives and mandates. In an 
evaluation of initiatives, including performance funding, Brown and Spies (2015) offer that 
institutions, particularly faculty and department heads, view these “not as system mandates, but 
as guidelines within which they had and continue to have a significant degree of autonomy to test 
and implement what works best for their students” (p. 18).  
 While each of the 58 NCCCS institutions varies geographically, there is also tremendous 
variation in size, student enrollment, and funding allocations. The smallest institution in the 
NCCCS enrolls fewer than 900 students annually, with an overall operating budget just under $6 
million, while the largest institution enrolls almost 41,000 students, with a budget of $116 
million. While the funding allocations for each NCCCS institution are undoubtedly proportional 
to their overall enrollment, it cannot be ignored that the ability to effectively address and respond 
to initiatives such as performance funding is inextricably tied to their overall operating budget 
and institutional resource capacity. The institutions chosen for this study are representative of the 
bottom 25% and middle 50% of all NCCCS institutions in overall student enrollment and 
operating budgets, while each is in the top 25% of performance funding allocations. It is 
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anticipated that these institutions will shed light on the impacts of performance funding and how 
they shape the experiences of community college faculty.  
Selecting Sites to Study 
 As highlighted in the literature, an institution’s ability to respond to performance funding 
initiatives is impacted significantly by both institutional capacity and presence of resources 
(Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thornton (2015) found that of 
the 952 public two-year community throughout the United States, 60% serve rural populations. 
Additionally, due to the reality of lower enrollment, small to medium institutions may find it 
difficult to respond to initiatives such as performance funding while continuing to be responsive 
to the needs of their students and community. Due to these realities, this study has chosen to 
focus on schools that are considered average or below average in both student enrollment and 
overall operating budget while comparing their performance funding summary data. It is 
presumed that institutions that are above average in student enrollment and overall operating 
budget also possess increased institutional capacity and a prevalence of external resources that 
allow them to respond with greater ease.  
In order to narrow down the list of potential study sites, institutions were examined using 
student enrollment, budget allocation information, and performance reporting and funding 
summary data. North Carolina community colleges are largely funded using student full-time 
equivalents (FTE). According to a 2016 Joint Legislative Program Evaluation Oversight 
Committee report (North Carolina General Assembly, 2016), budget FTE is calculated using 
actual student enrollment and the number of instructional hours delivered. One FTE is equal to 
512 scheduled class or laboratory hours per year. Therefore, institutions with larger student 
enrollments also have larger overall operating budgets compared to small to medium institutions 
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with smaller student enrollments. Due to existing organizational capacity and institutional 
resources, institutions with large student enrollments are better positioned to respond to 
initiatives such as performance funding models which in turn result in additional funds through 
performance allocations. Performance funds currently account for 2% of overall institutional 
funding. Increased organizational capacity and institutional resources can equate to the creation 
of new staff positions, additional faculty, and programs and services directly targeting 
performance funding measures. Likewise, small to medium sized institutions with lower student 
enrollments and smaller operating budgets may lack both the organizational capacity and 
institutional resources to add additional staff positions, faculty, or programs and services.  
Considering the realities of small to average size community colleges, this study 
examined the faculty experience at one medium sized school and one small school using student 
enrollment, budget allocation information, and performance reporting and funding summary 
data. Along with decreased institutional resources and reduced organizational capacity, smaller 
community colleges, particularly those in rural communities, find it difficult to recruit and retain 
qualified faculty (Thornton & Friedel, 2016). Thornton (2015) suggests that performance 
funding programs often focus on the metrics that are specific to higher education and not on the 
role the community college plays in the community development. Thornton (2015) adds that “the 
lack of rewarding the complete college identity within performance funding designs provides an 
important reason to study the effects of current PBF formulas on rural community colleges” (p. 
4).  
Using curriculum and continuing education unduplicated student enrollment data, total 
operating budget data, and total performance funding allocation data for the 2016-2017 year, 
schools were classified as either top 25th, middle 50th, or bottom 25th percentile institutions in 
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each of the above categories. Forty-six of the 58 NCCCS institutions had operating budgets, 
student enrollment data, and performance funding allocations that matched percentiles across all 
three measurements. In other words, institutions that were in the top 25% of student enrollment 
also were in the top 25% of operating budgets and performance funding respectively or vice 
versa. Of the remaining twelve institutions, four institutions had overall performance funding 
allocations that were higher than that of their overall budget and student enrollment. Two of the 
four institutions had both operating budgets and student enrollment data in the bottom 25th 
percentile, but performance funding allocations in the 50th percentile. The other two institutions 
had operating budgets and student enrollment data in the 50th percentile, but performance 
funding allocations in the top 25%.      
 The four potential institutions were grouped according to their percentile rank in each of 
the three categories regarding student enrollment, overall operating budget, and performance 
funding summary data. This resulted with two schools representing the 50th percentile in both 
enrollment and operating budget and top 25% in performance funding and two schools 
representing the bottom 25th percentile in in both enrollment and operating budget and the 50th 
percentile in performance funding. Each institution was further evaluated while closely 
examining their rural versus urban classification, institutional size, geographical location, and 
presence of external resources such as grants or other revenue allocations. Upon further 
examination it was determined that one of the institutions in the 50th percentile in student 
enrollment and overall operating budget was an outlier compared to the other institution in the 
same category. While the institution in question did fall in the 50th percentile, both its student 
enrollment and overall operating budget was on the fringe of the top 25%. In addition, the 
institution maintains 5 separate campuses, possesses a campus foundation of $12 million, and 
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was part of a $4.3 million Bill and Melinda Gate Completion by Design (CBD) grant initiative 
that began in 2012. This left only one institution in the 50th percentile in student enrollment and 
overall operating budget. This institution is located in eastern North Carolina.  
 The two institutions representing the bottom 25th percentile were similar in both student 
enrollment and overall operating budgets. According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics (2017), each was classified as rural or town campus settings. Both institutions received 
similar performance funding allocations and appear to have similar campuses in overall size and 
presence of external resources. Because of the eastern North Carolina geographical location of 
the first institution and due to the close similarities of each school, the second institution was 
chosen in part because it is located in the western part of the state.  
 The two colleges selected were given pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality. Faculty 
interviewed for the study would be less likely to be as forthcoming if the information they shared 
were likely to be detrimental to their career or institution. The two institutions are referred to as 
Eastern North Carolina Community College (ENCCC) and Western North Carolina Community 
College (WNCCC). The selection of ENCCC and WNCCC allows for a comparative study of 
how performance funding initiatives shape the experiences of community college faculty.  
Sites of Study 
For this case study, two North Carolina community colleges were compared, Eastern 
North Carolina Community College (ENCCC) and Western North Carolina Community College 
(WNCCC). Both ENCCC and WNCCC received performance funding allocations that ranked 
significantly higher across the NCCCS system than both their overall student enrollment and 
overall operating budget data.  
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Located in the Blue Ridge Mountains of North Carolina, the National Center for 
Education Statistics (2017) indicates WNCCC’s student enrollment topped 1,120 students during 
fall 2016. Their institution is comprised of a main campus complex with additional sites housing 
a small business center, advanced manufacturing center, and career center. Approximately 32% 
of the 147 instructional faculty are full-time while 68% are considered part-time. Of WNCCC’s 
student body, 71% are considered part-time while 29% attend full-time; 63% are female and 
38% are male; with 86% identified as white, 7% Latino, and 3% African American; students 24 
years or younger account for 65% of the population with the remaining 35% of students being 25 
years old or older. Of students who were both enrolled for the first time and considered full-time 
during fall 2013, 23% white, 25% Latino, and 0% African American students subsequently 
graduated within three years. Finally, WNCCC’s retention rate between fall 2015 and fall 2016 
was 57% for full-time students and 31% for part-time students.  
According to the National Center for Education Statistics (2017), ENCCC’s student 
enrollment reached 3,402 students during fall 2016. Similar to WNCCC, ENCCC operates 
multiple sites including a main campus, an aviation complex, business and industry center, and 
satellite campus on a nearby military installation. Approximately 41% of the 307 instructional 
faculty are full-time while 60% are considered part-time. Of ENCCC’s student body, 57% are 
considered part-time while 43% attend full-time; 60% are female and 40% male; with 60% 
identified as white, 21% African American, and 13% Latino; students 24 years or younger 
account for 69% of the population with the remaining 31% of students being 25 years old or 
older. Of students who were both enrolled for the first time and considered full-time during fall 
2013, 46% white, 31% Latino, and 20% African American students subsequently graduated 
within three years. Finally, WNCCC’s retention rate between fall 2015 and fall 2016 was 63% 
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for full-time students and 49% for part-time students. In addition to their traditional students, 
ENCCC serves two innovative public high schools with one being located on ENCCC’s main 
campus.  
Sample Selection 
This case study seeks to describe how the experiences of community college faculty are 
shaped by performance funding initiatives. As such, research participants will be selected 
through the use of purposeful sampling. Creswell (2013) offers that through purposeful 
sampling, researchers can select participants who “purposefully inform an understanding of the 
research problem and central phenomenon in the study” (p. 156). Furthermore, Yin (2014) states 
that participants can provide insights into the actions of the studied case as well as providing 
historical context. The theoretical framework of this study (Principal-Agent Theory) assumes the 
existence of conflict between both principal and agent; therefore, a purposeful sampling strategy 
will be utilized to select faculty participants who have knowledge or may otherwise be directly 
impacted by performance funding initiatives. In this study, participants were selected from each 
college based on their perceived knowledge and connection to the seven current NCCCS 
performance measures. Two of the seven NCCCS performance measures are directly connected 
to specific disciplines (curriculum math and English) while three others are directly connected to 
academic discipline areas (transfer success, basic skills progress, and licensure passing rate). The 
remaining two performance measures are more broad and generalized across the entire 
institution; thus, no one specific faculty group is connected (curriculum completion and first year 
progression). Two faculty will be interviewed from each of the following academic areas: 
The curriculum math department; the curriculum English department; college transfer (e.g. 
math, science, English, fine arts, and social sciences); basic skills (e.g. adult high school 
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and English as a Second Language [ESL]); and licensure programs (e.g. Licensed Practical 
Nurse (LPN), Registered Nurse (RN), Dental Assisting, Dental Hygienist, and Basic Law 
Enforcement Training [BLET]). The remaining two performance measures, curriculum 
completion and first year progression, are not specific to any particular academic major, thus the 
previously identified interview candidates can address these performance measures as well. Ten 
faculty interviews will be conducted at each institution for a total of 20 faculty individual 
interviews. Where possible, adjunct faculty will be included in the sample since both institutions 
utilize a significant percentage of such faculty. In addition, faculty who were teaching for the 
institution prior to 2012 will be preferred, as they will have contextual knowledge of their 
institutions pre/post-performance measure implementation. It is assumed that faculty will vary in 
age and years of experience.  
Data Collection Methods 
This section describes the data collection methods utilized in this study. Methods include 
semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and direct observation.  
According to Yin (2014), case studies provide appropriate avenues for exploring how and 
why questions. Thus, one of the most valuable sources of information is the personal interview. 
Accordingly, semi-structured interviews were the primary source of data for this study. The 
semi-structured interview protocol for this study can be found in Appendix B. Each of the 
questions was created with the faculty experience in mind and aims to allow faculty to expand on 
their own experiences as they relate specifically to performance funding. The questions tie 
specifically into the previously explored literature and theoretical frameworks of Principal-Agent 
Theory, Lipsky’s (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy, and Bottom-Up Policy Perspective. The 
questions are designed to shed further light on how the faculty experience is impacted by 
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performance incentives and how such impacts spur faculty to respond, if at all, as street-level 
bureaucrats.  
Question 1 establishes the position of each respondent as it relates to their campus. 
Questions 2-3 were crafted to examine respondent’s overall knowledge of performance funding 
initiatives in North Carolina. The literature showed faculty to have less knowledge about such 
programs than their administrators (Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2014). Questions 4-5 examine 
the experiences of the respondents inside and outside of the classroom. Questions 6-8, allow 
respondents to discuss how their institutions have responded to performance funding and how 
they have been able to be a part of that response. Questions 9-10 allow respondents to compare 
their experiences to those of faculty at other institutions and to add any information that may 
have been overlooked in the previous questions. Although the study seeks a consistent line of 
inquiry, due to the nature of qualitative research, the interview itself will be fluid and flexible 
(Yin, 2014). Faculty participants will be given pseudonyms in an effort to protect their identity.  
Yin (2014) offers that since case studies occur in real world environments, the 
opportunity for direct observations exist. This study is specifically interested in examining the 
faculty experience, therefore observations may vary from one site to the next depending on the 
processes, policies, and activities at each institution. Of particular interest will be any formal or 
informal campus committees that convene to specifically address performance measures and 
outcomes. Observations will be dependent upon the individual campus culture and available 
opportunities.  
Document Collection 
Because of their overall value, Yin (2014) states “documents play an explicit role in any 
data collection in doing case study research” (p. 107). Institutional and NCCCS documents 
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pertaining directly to the performance funding initiatives was collected, analyzed, and used to 
corroborate information received from faculty participants. These documents include the 
Performance Measures for Student Success annual report created by the NCCCS, the NCCCS 
website, the community college’s websites, catalogs, handbooks, annual budget reports, and 
other public documents. As noted in Yin (2014), case studies utilizing multiple sources of 
information is preferred and allows for a wide look at historical and behavioral issues. 
Site Visits 
 I visited each college to retrieve documentation and conduct semi-structured interviews 
with faculty participants. Due to location, interviews were conducted over two days at WNCCC 
and during a two week period at ENCCC. Documents were also collected by visiting each 
institutions website and the NCCCS website. Two electronic recording devices were utilized to 
record the individual interviews and I maintained a field journal for taking notes regarding 
observations and recording general thoughts about the experience.  
Data Analysis 
 The data from this study will be analyzed both as individual cases and through a cross-
case analysis. Institutional comparisons will include overall student enrollment, operating 
budgets, performance funding allocations, organizational charts, strategic plans, and institutional 
committees or structures pertinent to performance funding. Individual comparisons will include 
faculty workloads, committee responsibilities, institutional responsibilities such as advising or 
tutoring, and knowledge of performance funding. According to Yin (2014), a cross-case 
synthesis is appropriate when case studies involve at least two cases. Furthermore, Yin (2014) 
adds that findings are more likely to be more robust and potentially strengthens the findings 
further. Thomas (2006) recommends that inexperienced researchers immerse themselves into 
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their data through reading for content and identifying similarities, discrepancies, and omissions. 
This process involves the use of coding which Creswell (2013) defines as “aggregating the text 
or visual data into small categories of information, seeking evidence for the code from different 
databases being used in a study, and then assigning a label to the code” (p. 184). My analysis of 
the data will begin with open coding from which starter codes will be developed using my 
interview protocol and literature review as a reference which allows for themes and meaning to 
occur. All interviews will be recorded with the permission of each study participant. Interviews 
will later be transcribed and coded utilizing a password protect computer in a locked office. 
Coded interviews and documents allowed for further organization and analysis.  
Validity and Reliability 
 Validity and reliability in qualitative research is dependent upon keen pattern recognition 
and the general obligation on the part of the researcher to produce methodical details regarding 
data collection and analysis (Patton, 1999). Nobel and Smith (2015) add the goal of qualitative 
researchers is to “design and incorporate methodological strategies to ensure the trustworthiness 
of the findings” (p. 34).  
 Triangulation of multiple data sources is used within qualitative research to eliminate 
much of the vulnerability existent when only one source of data is utilized (Patton, 1999). Yin 
(2014) adds that a significant strength of case study data is the presence of multiple sources of 
data. This study will utilize data triangulation in examining data obtained through semi-
structured interviews, document analysis, and observation. The use of multiple data sources 
allows for the development of “converging lines of inquiry” thus producing a conclusion that is 
more convincing and accurate (Yin, 2014, p. 120). The semi-structured interviews in this study 
will look at the experiences of faculty and how they are shaped by intended and unintended 
57 
  
consequences of performance funding initiatives. As Yin (2014) describes, it is entirely possible 
that through the triangulation of data sources multiple realities exist as they relate to the faculty 
experience. The reliability of this study is supported through the use of a protocol that can be 
replicated.  
Limitations 
I have significant experience with the current NCCCS performance measures, both as a 
faculty member and administrator. The limitations in this study include both researcher and 
participant bias. Efforts will be taken to reduce any power imbalance between myself and the 
participants through the use of an interview protocol and the non-use of leading interview 
questions (Creswell, 2013). When utilizing interviews as part of qualitative research, Yin (2014) 
notes that the responses of interviewees are “subject to the common problems of bias, poor 
recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation” (p. 113). The use of data triangulation through 
conducting semi-structured interviews, collecting documentation, and observation will assist in 
reducing the limitations listed above.  
Summary 
 This chapter has summarized the qualitative methods of study used to examine how the 
experiences of community college faculty are shaped by performance funding initiatives. The 
overall design of the study, site selection, sample selection, data collection, data analysis, issues 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to compare how performance funding initiatives shape the 
experiences of community college faculty at two North Carolina Community Colleges. This 
chapter includes the major themes that emerged from the experiences of selected community 
college faculty at each institution. I collected, coded, and analyzed data from semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, and direct observations. The interview questions were designed to 
answer the overarching research question and sub-question: How do performance funding 
initiatives shape the experiences of community college faculty? Also, from where and to what 
extent they receive their information concerning performance funding and its impact on their 
institution. The interview questions tie specifically into the previously explored literature and 
theoretical frameworks of Principal-Agent Theory, Lipsky’s (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy, 
and Bottom-Up Policy Perspective.  
This chapter begins with a description of each college, followed by a brief description of 
the faculty participants in this study. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the significant 
themes that emerged from the data analysis and a cross-case comparison. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a brief summary.  
Context and Demographics 
Settings 
 The settings for this study were the campuses of two North Carolina Community 
Colleges. Both institutions have been assigned pseudonyms for the purpose of maintaining 
confidentiality. Western North Carolina Community College (WNCCC) is located in the Blue 
Ridge Mountains of North Carolina and has an enrollment of 1,120 students representing a 
student population that is 86% white, 7% Latino, and 3% African American. At the time of the 
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study, the institution composed of a main campus complex and additional sites housing a small 
business center, advanced manufacturing center, and career center. Approximately 32% of the 
147 instructional faculty are full-time, while 68% are considered part-time. The mission of 
WNCCC is to provide student-centered, accessible, high-quality educational opportunities and 
services that fulfill the personal development, training, and employment needs of residents, 
businesses, and industries through an open-door admissions policy. 
Located in Eastern North Carolina, Eastern North Carolina Community College 
(ENCCC) has an enrollment of 3,402 students representing a slightly more diverse student 
population that is 60% white, 21% African American, and 13% Latino. Similar to WNCCC, 
ENCCC operates multiple sites, including a main campus, an aviation complex, business and 
industry center, and satellite campus on a nearby military installation. Approximately 41% of the 
307 instructional faculty are full-time, while 60% are considered part-time. The mission of 
ENCCC is to meet the educational, training, and cultural needs of the communities it serves.  
Although one-third the size of ENCCC, WNCCC’s organizational chart is similar but 
representative of an institution lacking the organizational capacity and resources of ENCCC. 
WNCCC’s executive leadership includes the President, a Vice-President for Finance and 
Administration, a Vice-President for Learning and Student Services, an Executive Director for 
the Foundation, a Resource Development Officer, a Director of Technology, a Director of 
External Relations, and Director of Institutional Effectiveness. ENCCC’s executive leadership 
includes the President, a Vice President for Administrative and Financial Services/Chief 
Financial Offer, a Vice-President of Academic and Student Services, an Associate Vice-
President of Academic and Student Services, an Associate Vice-President of Continuing 
Education Services, an Associate Vice-President of Administrative Services, an Associate Vice-
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President of Human Resources, Marketing, Safety, and Compliance, an Associate Vice-President 
of Institutional Effectiveness/Chief of Staff, an Executive Director for the Foundation, and an 
Executive Director for the Business and Industry Center and Works Initiative. Both institutions 
refer to their executive leadership team as the President’s Council. In addition, ENCCC has five 
academic curriculum divisions, with each division led by a division dean. Department chairs 
and/or program directors oversee each academic discipline within the division. There are twenty-
two different department chairs/program directors throughout the five academic curriculum 
divisions. Transitional programs for college and career include areas such as basic skills and 
adult high school and falls under the Associate Vice-President for Continuing Education 
Services. WNCCC employs two academic deans who oversee the entire campus. The Dean of 
Health Sciences oversees all academic programs related to allied health and health sciences. 
There is one department chair within health sciences. The Dean of Academic Programs oversees 
all other remaining academic areas. Within these areas there are three department chairs. Basic 
skills and adult high school fall under the Director of Career and College Readiness, which 
reports directly to the Vice-President of Learning and Students Services.  
A review of the 2019-2024 strategic plan shows that ENCCC makes use of a planning 
council consisting of 35 members. Of those, 18 are permanent members and include each of the 
President’s Council members, the public information officer, each of the five academic division 
deans, institutional effectiveness staff, and the information technology director. The remaining 
17 members rotate from areas such as administrative and financial services/human resources, 
student services, academic services, workforce continuing education services, and each of the 
five academic divisions. While the Planning Council at ENCCC is responsible for overseeing a 
myriad of areas including the Institutional Effectiveness Plan, Strategic Plan, and Academic 
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Assessment, of particular interest to this study is the reality that within the planning council are 
sub-committees for each of the seven NCCCS performance measures. Each sub-committee is 
chaired by a member of the planning council, with each chair responsible for creating a 
membership of appropriate members outside of the planning council. Each committee is 
responsible for meeting at least twice each academic year to evaluate the previous year’s 
performance measures report and discuss improvement strategies. Each sub-committee chair is 
tasked with completing a year-end report that evaluates the effectiveness of past strategies/action 
items and creating new strategies/action items for the next year. Some of the sub-committee 
chairs are permanent members, while others are members who will rotate off every two to three 
years. A review of the strategic plan at WNCCC showed no similar initiatives at the institution.  
In 2016, ENCCC was reaccredited through the Southern Association of Colleges and 
School Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC) and is currently in the middle of a Quality 
Enhancement Plan (QEP) that is addressing academic advising and academic planning within the 
college transfer student population. The fifth year report will be due in 2021. By contrast, 
WNCCC is getting ready to begin its reaccreditation process through SACSCOC. The last QEP 
at WNCCC involved the creation of an academic resource center.  
Participants 
 There were twenty faculty participants interviewed for this study, with ten representing 
WNCCC and ten representing ENCCC. All faculty were full-time and taught specific disciplines 
in the areas of curriculum math and English, college transfer, basic skills, and licensure 
programs. There were three notable exceptions to the above faculty at WNCCC. Due to its 
overall size, WNCCC employs one full-time English instructor, thus a full-time pre-curriculum 
English instructor replaced the second curriculum English faculty. In addition, both of the basic 
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skills faculty members were part-time and worked 20 to 25 hours per week. Each participant in 
this study was assigned a pseudonym for the purpose of providing individual confidentiality. 
Table 1 provides a summary of faculty by sex, years of service, and academic discipline.  
Themes 
 Themes emerged as a result of the review of relevant documentation and participant 
interviews. Relevant documentation was retrieved from the websites of both institutions, as well 
as the North Carolina Community College System website. All documentation was publicly 
available and included Board of Trustees meetings, strategic plans, performance measures 
success reports, budget allocation reports, and organizational charts. Board of Trustees meeting 
minutes were only publicly available for WNCCC and included years 2017 through 2019. No 
Board of Trustees meeting minutes were available at ENCCC. Strategic plans included 
WNCCC’s 2015-2020 plan and ENCCC’s 2013-2016 and 2019-2024 plans. The performance 
measures success reports reviewed were years 2014-2019. Budget allocation reports were 
reviewed for each institution and included fiscal years 2017-2019, these being the only years 
publicly available. The current organizational charts at both institutions were available online. 
Table 2 provides a summary of all the documents reviewed per institution and the academic 
years for the reports. Interviews were recorded and transcribed using Otter AI software, and each 
of the resulting transcripts was carefully reviewed to ensure the fidelity of the spoken word. 
Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and one hour for each participant. At ENCCC, each of 
the interviews was conducted in the participant’s office. Eight of the ten interviews at WNCCC 
were conducted in a vacant office centrally located on campus. The remaining two interviews 
occurred at WNCCC’s small business center, which houses basic skills. Observations occurred 














    
Western North Carolina 
Community College 
   
    
     Elaine F <1 Basic Skills 
     Bethany F 1.5 Basic Skills 
     Aaron M 8 Basic Law Enforcement Training 
     Clint M 10 Biology 
     Susan F 14 Nursing 
     Jessica F 15 Mathematics 
     James M 18 History/Sociology 
     Donna  F 23.5 * 
     John M 24.5 * 
     Joann F 28 Mathematics 
    
Eastern North Carolina 
Community College 
   
    
     Stacie F 4.5 Mathematics 
     Roslyn F 5 Transitional Programs for College & Career 
     Jocelyn F 6 English  
     Adam M 6 Biology 
     Chuck M 6 Psychology 
     Sam M 7 Nursing 
     Mark M 10 Basic Skills 
     Gwen F 13 Emergency Management Services 
     Stephanie F 18 Mathematics 
     Ron M 22 English 










Documents Reviewed by Institution 
 
Document Type/Year ENCCC WNCCC 
   
*Board of Trustees Meetings (2017-2019)  •  
   
Strategic Plan (2015-2020)  •  
   
Strategic Plan (2013-2016) •   
   
Strategic Plan (2019-2024) •   
   
Performance Measure Success Reports (2014-2019) •  •  
   
Budget Allocation Reports (2017-2020) •  •  
   
Organizational Charts •  •  













documented using field notes and focused on the body language, facial expressions, and other 
non-verbal communications of study participants. Observations did not meet the traditional 
standards of direct-observations that occur within the natural setting of the research site such as 
meetings, interactions, or classrooms. Once I was in the field, the direct observations I originally 
thought would add value to the study did not, in fact, offer much value at all. Instead, I focused 
on the other sources of data, particularly participant interviews.   
 Manual coding was used to organize and analyze the data gathered from the semi-
structured interviews. The interview protocol of this study closely followed the previously 
explored literature and theoretical frameworks of Principal-Agent Theory, Lipsky’s (1980) 
Street-Level Bureaucracy, and Bottom-Up Policy Perspective and allowed for the creation of 
thematic categories. In addition, the review of institutional documentation allowed for greater 
specificity within the interview questions. Given the interview protocol’s connectedness to the 
literature of the study’s theoretical frameworks, starter codes were specifically generated from 
the literature and employed during the first reading of the transcripts. As discussed in Saldana 
(2016), qualitative data requires multiple passes and reflection, thus the transcripts were 
reviewed multiple times. During the second review of the transcripts, new emergent codes were 
identified, as well as the creation of categories of data. I also noted and highlighted direct quotes 
in the transcripts that illuminated concepts or theories discussed in the literature. Using these 
categories of data, themes were developed prior to the third review of interview transcripts. 
Initially, there were four themes and 8 subthemes; however, during the third review, the issue of 
fairness was identified as a significant subtheme regarding how faculty respond to performance 
funding. In addition, a new theme emerged regarding the impact of external agencies on the out-
of-class faculty experience.  
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Six major themes and four subthemes emerged from the collected data of this study 
regarding how the experiences of community college faculty are shaped by performance funding 
initiatives: 
1.  The awareness of performance funding measures is relative to faculty member’s 
obligations within the institution and their overall desire to be informed 
a. Faculty are familiar with performance funding, but lack specific knowledge 
b. The dissemination of information regarding institutional performance varies and 
is dependent upon the sharing of information 
2.  The institutional response to performance funding measures is dependent upon the 
organizational capacity and budgetary capabilities of each institution 
3.  How performance measures shape the in-class faculty is dependent upon the 
institution and overall perceptions of faculty  
4.  Institutional focus on retention and success have indirect impacts on the in-class 
experience 
5.  External agencies add institutional responsibilities that shape the out of class faculty 
experience 
6.  The faculty response to performance funding measures varies according to the 
institution 
a. Fairness is a matter of perception 
b. There is a lack of faculty opposition to performance funding 
Faculty Awareness Relative to Job Roles 
The awareness of performance funding measures is relative to faculty member’s 
obligations within the institution and their overall desire to be informed. Faculty are familiar 
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with performance funding, but lack specific knowledge. Study participants were generally 
familiar with the concept of performance funding, but lacked specific knowledge of actual 
performance measures, particularly those measures that are not directly tied to their academic 
discipline. The faculty at ENCCC who were found to be familiar, but lacking specific 
knowledge, were all aware that performance measures provide additional funds to the overall 
operating budget, but were unaware of funding totals. Jocelyn stated, “I don’t pay so much 
attention to the money side. I think I focus more on what our students can and cannot do. The 
money is a secondary concern.” Sam added, “I don’t know what percentages are being looked at, 
but I do know that you have to maintain a certain percentage to receive a certain level of 
funding.” Due to their involvement with the planning council and performance measure 
subcommittees, two of the ten faculty at ENCCC were found to be familiar and more 
knowledgeable than the other participants. Stephanie indicated that she had been on the planning 
council for nine years and had been the chair of the math performance measure subcommittee for 
five years. Stephanie indicated she considered herself to be “the resident expert on the math 
performance measures” and that she had spent a lot of time reviewing math performance 
outcomes over the previous five years. Gwen stated that she had been on the planning council so 
many years that she couldn’t remember not being on it. Gwen was also the subcommittee chair 
for licensure pass rates. Both Stephanie and Gwen discussed the NC Performance Measures for 
Student Success Report and voiced their understanding of the reporting process. Gwen and 
Stephanie each indicated they had attended previous “performance summits” sponsored by the 
NCCCS each year summer in Cary, NC. While Stephanie and Gwen were found to be familiar 
with and knowledgeable of performance funding, neither knew to what extent their institution 
received performance allocations. Interestingly, when asked about the impact of performance 
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funding on the institution, Gwen stated, “I know we’re here for education, but ultimately it 
(ENCCC) is a business, and it has to be funded in order for the programs to get the equipment 
they need and to be the best programs they can be. Licensure pass rates are extremely important 
to our business.”  
 Faculty at WNCCC were found to be diverse in their familiarity, or lack thereof, with 
performance measures. Five of the ten faculty at WNCCC indicated they had no knowledge of 
performance funding. Susan indicated, “I really, probably, have no understanding of it at all 
whatsoever.” John added that he “had never heard of it.” Jessica offered, “I do not know 
anything about that” and “I just do my job to the best of my ability and hopefully when they pull 
data, it’s good.” Aaron stated that he didn’t “have a vast knowledge” of performance funding. 
Each of these faculty, excluding John, all taught in areas with discipline specific performance 
measures. Similar to ENCCC, five of the ten faculty at WNCCC were familiar with the concept 
of performance funding, but unaware of the funding totals for the institution. James stated that he 
had no idea how performance funding dollars were allotted for institutional expenses or 
initiatives. Joann stated that she understood WNCCC had done fairly well on the performance 
measures, but added “as far as the amount of money, I don’t know.” Bethany was found to be the 
most knowledgeable faculty member, but was one of the newest faculty members interviewed. 
She indicated that she had participated in personal professional development through a nearby 
state university designed specifically for college and career readiness faculty, which increased 
her overall knowledge.  
Flow of Dissemination  
The dissemination of information regarding institutional performance varies and is 
dependent upon the sharing of information. Nearly all participants indicated that information 
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typically flows from either the president’s office or the Office of Institutional Effectiveness at 
ENCCC. Aside from Stephanie and Gwen, who were on the Planning Council, no other faculty 
indicated they were aware of faculty led meetings in which performance measures or funding 
were discussed. Most study participants indicated they received most of their information 
concerning performance funding from administrators at campus-wide gatherings or other formal 
meetings. At ENCCC, Convocation is held each year in August prior to the first day of classes. 
Convocation is led by the President’s Council, with each of the members allotted time to speak 
on matters or issues specifically related to their areas. Stacie offered that she received most of 
her information regarding performance funding from either Convocation or her division meeting 
that occurs at the beginning of the semester each fall. Adam stated, “At Convocation we go 
through some of that stuff, and they have a review of the previous academic year.” Sam added 
that it’s addressed at convocation, “but that’s probably where nursing faculty get most of their 
information” and “we get updates from our Division Dean periodically, but most information 
comes from Convocation.” Chuck added that the information shared at Convocation was more 
along the lines of “matter of fact” than discussion: “There’s not a lot of discussion in 
Convocation about what we need to do to get where we need to be.” He added, “We’ve always 
been pushed by administration to do the best we can… I only hear about it when things aren’t as 
good as maybe they need to be.” Chuck felt like most of the pertinent information concerning 
specific performance measures is shared at the individual performance measures subcommittee 
meetings.  
 The Planning Council at ENCCC is a significant source of information for a variety of 
campus issues, but specifically for performance funding. However, the dissemination of 
information from Planning Council is dependent upon the members taking the information back 
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to their respective departments and sharing. While Stephanie stated “everything comes through 
the Planning Council,” she acknowledged that “I think I know a little more about performance 
measures because I am on the Planning Council and I am the chair of the math performance 
measure subcommittee.” Gwen echoed similar thoughts as the subcommittee chair for Licensure 
Pass Rates. As evidence of this dynamic, Ron and Jocelyn, who are both English faculty 
members, were unaware of an English performance measure subcommittee within the Planning 
Council. Jocelyn stated that it made sense to have such a committee, but didn’t surprise her that 
she didn’t know. Ron added, “I probably should have known, but I don’t.” When pressed further 
as to why they didn’t know, neither was willing to lay blame at the feet of the subcommittee 
chair, who was a fellow English faculty member, for a failure to communicate. Jocelyn stated, “I 
would like to know more because everyone’s uncomfortable when they are ignorant. So sure, it 
would be nice to know more about it, but I am not sure about the best way to do that.” 
In addition to Convocation, Planning Council, and the individual performance measure 
subcommittees, the president at ENCCC produces a newsletter every two to three months. A 
review of the most recent presidential newsletter indicated that it was mainly a source of good 
news regarding campus events and happenings and a location for the president to offer 
congratulatory remarks to faculty who had received awards or had been recognized in the 
community. Roslyn was the only faculty member to reference the president’s newsletter, but she 
indicated that she felt disconnected from the rest of campus as a continuing education faculty 
member. Roslyn stated that she used to receive most of her information from her administrative 
supervisors, who recently retired. Now she feels as though she has to find out information on her 
own and offered that “occasionally we do get a ‘you’re doing good,’ but not so much as before 
the retirements.” Mark, who is also located in Continuing Education, echoed similar thoughts 
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concerning the deprivation of information following the recent retirements. Mark stated, “We 
used to have meetings every week, now every couple of months, but we were much more 
informed when we had regular meetings.” In regards to the retirements and the filling of those 
vacancies, Roslyn indicated that those roles had been filled, but it was through the shuffling of 
current faculty and staff, and she added, “Right now a lot of people are taking on multiple roles 
and changing hats.” The president at ENCCC also hosts a monthly Coffee with the President 
event at which he discusses the current state of affairs at the college. Each of these events occurs 
from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. Two faculty members referenced these events, but offered that they 
rarely attend. Mark explained, “When he first started having them, I attended regularly, but they 
are largely attended by staff and only the president speaks. There is not really an opportunity to 
ask questions.”  
Participants at WNCCC painted a much different picture of their organization’s effort to 
share information. Similar to ENCCC, information at WNCCC is generally shared by either the 
president, vice-president, or director of institutional effectiveness. All participants indicated that 
WNCCC has college wide meetings once or twice a year, and news regarding performance 
funding is typically shared at one of these meetings. There was no indication that WNCCC 
utilizes any formal campus committees similar to ENCCC’s Planning Council or performance 
measure subcommittees.  
Participants generally demonstrated less enthusiasm for campus wide meetings and 
downplayed their significance. James stated:  
Departmentally, we never discuss it. Either amongst the faculty or with the department 
chair or dean. Once a year, we’ll come together and have a professional development 
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meeting, and sometimes the Director of Institutional Effectiveness, President, or Vice-
President will mention performance measures and its funding. 
 When asked how often faculty are addressed regarding performance funding, Donna replied, 
“We’re not, other than it’s generally brought up in once-a-year meetings, but it’s not a regular 
discussion.” Jessica and Donna both indicated that performance funding information usually 
originates from the Director of Institutional Effectiveness via email and is then shared at the 
campus meetings. Elaine stated, “I don’t look at the information. I don’t feel restricted to the 
information necessarily, but it’s not useful to me in the classroom.” Other faculty indicated that 
they were a little more skeptical of the sharing of information and the faculty’s overall 
knowledge of performance funding. Clint indicated that he didn’t have a high need to know, but 
added, “A little more transparency would be of value. I feel like we get enough information, but I 
think there could…I would appreciate more.” When asked if she felt like faculty were well aware 
of issues such as performance funding, Susan offered, “I don’t know that I would say that. I think 
it would depend on the faculty. Let’s just say aware, I don’t know that I would say well aware.”  
Jessica stated, “The one common thread on this campus, even with an administration change, is 
communication is poor, always has been for as long as I’ve been here.” 
Performance Funding Relative to Institutional Capacity and Capabilities 
The institutional response to performance funding measures is dependent upon the 
organizational capacity and budgetary capabilities of each institution. ENCCC and WNCCC 
varied greatly in both their organizational capacity and budgetary concerns. As an average sized 
institution, ENCCC possesses a robust organizational chart along with sufficient historical 
student enrollments and corresponding operating budgets. At nearly one-third the size of 
ENCCC, WNCCC faces significantly lower student enrollments and operating budgets. A review 
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of enrollment and budget data on the NCCCS website shows that between 2014-2015 and 2018-
2019 WNCCC experienced a 10.3% overall reduction in full-time equivalents (FTE) and a 3.5% 
overall reduction in total institutional and academic support budget. Likewise, ENCCC 
experienced only a 6.5% overall reduction in FTE, but its total institutional and academic support 
budgets rose 1.9%. Performance based allocations are included within the institutional and 
academic support budgets, as well. During this same time period, WNCCC’s performance 
allocations were up 18.5% compared to ENCCC’s, which were slightly down 1.1%. It is 
important to note, however, that ENCCC experienced four consecutive years of growth in 
performance allocations between 2014-2015 and 2017-2018, with 2018-2019 being the outlier. 
Even with WNCCC’s considerable growth in performance allocations, its budget is still nearly 
one-third that of ENCCC. Several participants at WNCCC voiced concerns regarding recent 
reductions in force (RIF) that had largely impacted faculty positions. In addition, several 
WNCCC participants interviewed for the study were the sole faculty presence in their respective 
areas, whereas nearly all of the participants at ENCCC belong to departments that utilized five to 
ten full-time faculty members, plus a department chair or program director. A review of available 
documents or participant accounts did not reveal any formal committees at WNCCC similar to 
the Planning Council at ENCCC.  
An iteration of the Planning Council at ENCCC has been in place since at least the early 
2000s. Prior to performance funding, the planning council was primarily used as a forum to 
prioritize planning objectives for equipment. One participant stated, “Back in the old days, the 
Planning Council was like horse trading in the Wild West. If you had a planning objective you 
wanted funding for, you found a way to make allies in another area and simply traded votes.” 
The current iteration of the Planning Council at ENCCC took shape at the same time as the 
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inception of the most recent NCCCS performance funding model in 2012. During this time, it 
became much more refined and serves three primary purposes: (1) to guide the college’s 
planning and institutional effectiveness process, (2) to serve as liaisons for the various planning 
groups and units, and (3) to ensure continuing compliance with SACSCOC. As previously 
discussed, within the Planning Council each of the seven NCCCS performance measures has 
individual subcommittees, with a member of the Planning Council serving as the responsible 
subcommittee chair. The memberships of these committees range from four to seven members.  
While the majority of participants interviewed at ENCCC were largely unfamiliar with 
the details of the Planning Council, the impact and presence of the Planning Council was 
obvious. While Gwen and Stephanie had served on the committee for a number of years, and 
Chuck had recently served on the math performance measure subcommittee, other faculty 
members recalled ways they had seen the Planning Council in action as well. Jocelyn and Stacie 
both referenced ways in which they had seen impacts to the way faculty advised and the 
prioritization of math within academic programs. Both indicated that, through the work of the 
Planning Council most academic programs across campus had adjusted their curriculums in 
order for math to be taken during the first two academic semester. Jocelyn explained, “Our dean, 
in coordination with the college transfer advising center director, designed advising sheets for all 
college transfer faculty use so that we are constantly reminded to put students in English and 
math first.”   
The Planning Council at ENCCC is a significant commitment to performance funding 
and is indicative of the administration’s response to the pursuit of performance excellence. In 
regards to the institutional response to performance funding, Chuck stated, “The institution takes 
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it (performance funding) seriously, the allocation of human resources to those subcommittees 
shows that they’re taking it seriously.” Stephanie offered: 
When the performance measures first came out, we, as a Planning Council, jumped on 
them. I’ve been at other events across the state, and colleges are just now getting on 
board with this idea. I think we’ve been in the forefront of making decisions to try and 
improve our performance measures. 
Gwen added, “All these performance subcommittees have made a big push to make sure the 
performance measures are where they need to be or at least putting them, in regards to priority, 
where they need to be.”  
The majority of participants at WNCCC were concerned about the budget constraints and 
the pressures being placed on faculty, including recent reductions in force. James stated:  
Obviously, we’ve had tremendous budget cuts, which over time has just placed inordinate  
duress on various aspects of the institution. Faculty and staff at times are stretched too  
thin. Faculty are getting together a couple of times a year to take care of landscaping,  
trimming bushes, weeding flower beds, cleaning bathrooms and classrooms. I mean the  
budget is terrible, it’s a terrible situation with faculty and staff cuts now, year in and year 
out. At some point you begin to wonder if they can’t take any more flesh, when will they 
take the body.  
It is important to note that James’ last statement regarding flesh and the body was in reference to 
campus consolidations in an effort to save costs. James was the only participant to reference 
consolidation. Joann offered that budget concerns weigh on faculty more than anything else, 
including performance funding. “We’re very concerned with the budget here. For four years 
now, it has just been the thing that weighs on us, knowing that we may not have materials to 
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work with in our classroom.” When asked if the budget was a concern for him, Aaron stated, 
“Absolutely, sometimes I can ask for certain things, and I get it, other times I get the hard “no” 
and “try again some other time.” Aaron also voiced concerns with what he sees as a lack of 
staffing in his area as well. Within his program area, it is only him and one other Qualified 
Assistant (QA). He stated that between 2017-2018 and 2018-2019, his area saw an increase of 
nearly 300 students, but he added, “The struggle keeps coming at us with budgeting woes and a 
lack of resources.” According to Aaron, within the Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET) 
program, resources such as training vehicles, guns, and ammunition are always an issue. 
Criminal justice education training standards requires that WNCCC have four fully operating 
training vehicles. Aaron indicated that WNCCC currently had six cars, four of which were 
currently operating. Aaron stated that he desperately needed cars and had sought out grant 
opportunities through Homeland Security in the past. Aaron added, “I have no clue how to write 
grants, so I wasn’t surprised to be turned down.” Bethany voiced similar concerns within basic 
skills. According to Bethany: 
The first thing that’s cut is career and college readiness (CCR). The cuts definitely affect 
us. The budget is what it is; we have very few resources. The internet is my best friend 
because I can get worksheets without having to have a textbook, which we don’t have the 
budget for. Occasionally, we will get to order some things and we scrounge around to 
find things for our classes.  
While Clint voiced concerns regarding the budget and recent RIFs, his tone was much softer and 
sympathetic towards the administration. When speaking about RIFs Clint stated, “People are 




I see both sides of it very clearly. I don’t know that everybody else does. People are 
just…, they get it in a corner somewhere and they forget that there’s a bigger world 
within the campus. It was interesting to watch people…finally have the blinders removed. 
From my perspective, I’ve seen a very humane administration trying their best to 
negotiate a very difficult circumstance. 
When harkening back to the topic of faculty and staff helping in other areas such as the campus 
landscape, he stated, “I remember an email coming out about working in the garden, and I 
thought to myself, yeah, that’s where we are as an institution.” Clint and other participants all 
agreed, however, that helping with activities such as campus landscaping was completely 
voluntary.  
Performance Measures Relative to Faculty Perceptions 
How performance measures shape the in-class faculty experience is dependent upon the 
institution and overall perceptions of faculty. While faculty workload is a small part of the in-
class experience for faculty, faculty at ENCCC and WNCCC shared very different experiences 
regarding workload. ENCCC is 15-22 contact hours, with full-time faculty adhering to an 
unwritten expectation of 18 contact hours each semester. The expected faculty workload at 
WNCCC is 18-21; however, most faculty indicated they teach far more contact hours than is 
expected. While no faculty at WNCCC referenced their teaching load as a source of conflict, five 
of the ten faculty indicated they teach significantly more contact hours than the expected 18-21. 
James indicated that he typically teaches 33-36 contact hours in the spring and around 45 each 
fall. James was by far the most extreme, but Donna, John, Jessica, and Clint all indicated they 
taught 24-28 contact hours each semester as well. Clint shared that as a result of a partnership 
between WNCCC and another NCCCS institution, he taught an online science course for the 
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partner institution, with 100 students enrolled during spring 2019. All faculty acknowledged they 
received “overload pay” for each additional hour over 21. As a single mother, Donna stated that 
the overload pay had allowed her to put two kids through college and made a huge difference in 
her household. Each of the above WNCCC faculty were appreciative of the opportunity to earn 
additional income. 
 All ten participants at WNCCC indicated that performance funding had no direct impact 
on their in-class experience, compared to only four of ten participants at ENCCC. Some of the 
participants at WNCCC and ENCCC were emphatic in their assertion that performance funding 
had not impacted their in-class experience while offering very direct statements such as “I don’t 
think about it”, “not at all”, “none whatsoever”, or “never enters my mind.” Other participants 
focused their response on their individual teaching style and/or student success. At WNCCC, 
Jessica stated, “I’m just trying to help students pass. I teach to the best of my ability, that’s all 
I’m thinking about.” Jessica noted that math faculty collectively adopted a flipped classroom 
model during the last academic year, but she added, “Any changes we have made have been the 
result of the challenging attitudes and practices of students involving technology and devices.” 
Donna, too, felt that she teaches to the best of her ability and noted that her primary task was to 
prepare students for transfer. “I don’t do anything differently based on funding; I want my 
students to get the same experience in my classroom that they would get at any four year 
institution.” Likewise, Bethany wasn’t concerned with performance funding, stating, “I have 
never taught to the test. That’s not my thing; I think learning should be fun.” Joann was a little 
broader in her response, stating that “WNCCC puts our students first. We want them to learn and 
we are going to give them our very best effort.” She also doubted that any faculty would feel as 
though performance funding had impacted their classroom.  
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While fewer participants at ENCCC believed performance funding had not impacted their 
in-class experience, those who didn’t indicated they were also focused on student success or their 
individual teaching styles as opposed to performance funding. Adam and Jocelyn both felt their 
primary concern was always the success of the student. Adam added: 
I spend a lot of time thinking about a lot of things, but performance funding isn’t one of 
them. My task as a teacher is to teach all of my students to the best of my ability and I 
can’t do that if I am consumed by things out of my control like performance funding.  
Chuck felt his primary responsibility was to prepare his students for transfer to a four year 
institution. “I run my classes how I expect them to run at the university so that my students aren’t 
so shocked once they transfer.” Of the four participants at ENCCC who indicated performance 
funding had not impacted their in-class experience, each stated that the specific language of 
performance funding did not cross their mind as they taught their classes.  
 Of the participants at ENCCC who felt as though performance funding had directly 
impacted their in-class experience, most attributed additional stress or pressure as the most 
common outcome. Ron stated: 
I’ve noticed more external pressure than in the past. I can’t say that it is overwhelming, 
no one is there looking over my shoulder as I teach, but at the same time I am very aware 
of it. We talk about it (English success performance measures) in department meetings 
and that does affect how I teach in the classroom in terms of the things I choose to 
emphasize or the concepts I cover in greater detail.  
When asked for clarification regarding his use of “external pressure,” Ron added that he was 
specifically referring to administrative pressure, noting, “There have been times in the past 
where it has been far heavier, but at the moment it doesn’t seem to be quite so heavy handed.” 
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Roslyn noted that teaching transitional studies had always been difficult, but the addition of 
performance measures and alterations from one year to the next made an already challenging job 
that much more difficult. Roslyn felt that the worries of student attendance and participation in 
conjunction with measurable skill gains created an environment that “was constantly stressful.” 
While Roslyn felt as though her job was stressful, she didn’t feel as though the stress was created 
from within the institution, but rather was a product of initiatives being passed down to 
institutions from the NCCCS. Gwen also felt that performance measures had added additional 
pressures to her classroom. Gwen stated: 
We have always wanted our students to get the education they deserve, we want 
exceptional EMTs and paramedics treating our community, but there’s an added pressure 
now to make sure they not only pass the program, but that they pass the licensing exam 
on the first attempt.  
Gwen felt that the performance measure had forced her and her colleagues to spend more time 
teaching topics such as study skills and note taking. As part of their program, they also now work 
with students on test taking strategies in an effort to reduce the number of students having to 
retake the licensing exam. Stephanie and Stacie both felt that performance funding had directly 
added pressure or stress to their in-class experience. Stephanie stated, “There has always been a 
pressure inside the classroom to try and make sure our students are successful, but now there’s 
always that “we need a green light” in the back of our mind.” Similarly, Stacie felt as though 
performance measures place additional stress on faculty to make sure students are successful, 





In-Class Experience Relative to Retention 
Institutional focus on retention and success have indirect impacts on the in-class 
experience. While participants at WNCCC and ENCCC had differing opinions regarding the 
impact of performance funding on their in-class experience, it was obvious that student retention 
and success were as important, if not more so, in shaping the faculty experience. ENCCC was 
noticeably more invested, as an institution, in pursuing student retention and success than 
WNCCC. As part of the Strategic Plan for Institutional Effectiveness at ENCCC, each academic 
program identifies intended program outcomes (POs), assesses those outcomes, and uses the 
results to make improvements. As noted by participants and confirmed by reviewing previous 
PO reports, each academic program’s PO was programmatic and institutional retention. As part 
of the assessment report, each academic program is provided a standard template that includes 
the previous year’s fall to fall and fall to spring retention data. Included in the report is a 
baseline, which is the previous three years’ average, and a standard and target. Both the standard 
and target are selected by the program faculty based on the established baseline and 
programmatic data. Beginning in 2018-2019, program reports only included fall to fall retention. 
Much like the performance measure subcommittee reports, each of the PO reports includes 
strategies to increase programmatic and institutional retention, and most academic reports 
utilized between two and five individual strategies. Strategies included items such as opening 
labs for students to remediate content already covered, implementing retention software, creating 
cohorts with activities for first year students, and adding more intensive writing assignments. 
The PO reports are due each April and are completed by the appropriate program director, 
department chair, or academic dean.  
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In addition to the PO reports, faculty at ENCCC also submit retention and success data at 
the end of each academic semester. Faculty are responsible for collecting and submitting three 
pieces of information for each class: (1) the number of students at the 10% point, (2) the number 
of students who finished the class, and (3) the number of students who successfully finished the 
class with a C or better. These data are entered into a departmental spreadsheet that includes each 
of the classes taught by the instructor, as well as by the other faculty within a given department. 
Each department’s spreadsheet is sent to the Office of Institutional Effectiveness.  
The majority of participants at ENCCC indicated that retention and success are a vital 
part of their in-class experience. Participants also discussed the relationship between retention 
and success and academic rigor, specifically noting the challenges of maintaining a balance 
between quality and student success. Jocelyn provided the clearest explanation of this 
relationship and the challenges faced by faculty:  
I aim to give my students a rigorous experience. I hope that they can be successful, but at 
the very least I want to retain them because even if they don’t succeed the first time, they 
can a second time. Unfortunately, we treat retention, success, and rigor as three separate 
things when we turn our data in at the end of the semester, but they aren’t. Even if our 
students aren’t succeeding and meeting the rigorous goals we set for them, it’s important 
we retain them and get them to try throughout the semester and perhaps return the 
following semester and successfully pass a course.  
Stacie offered: 
The words “retention” and “success” ring loudly in our minds as we’re in the classroom 
because of what we’ve heard from our higher authorities about retention and success. We 
know those numbers are looked at and it makes you think about your rigor in the 
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classroom. Sometimes you want to go more in depth, but you know that some students 
just aren’t capable and you just don’t want them to drop the course. 
Stephanie added that there was a fine line between retention and success. Stephanie felt that all 
faculty want their students to be successful, but faculty also want students who aren’t successful 
to remain in the class until the end. “We don’t want to drop them,” she says. “We want to keep 
them in class, but we don’t want to pass someone that doesn’t know what they are doing. So the 
struggle we face daily is trying to maintain our rigor and quality given our student population.” 
Adam acknowledged this struggle when he discussed the balance between rigor and the reality 
that funding is tied to retention and success. Adam felt that too many measures within higher 
education are focused on retention and success and not on overall academic quality. He 
referenced the NCCCS performance measures and noted that five of the seven are essentially 
measures of retention and success and have nothing to do with excellence or programmatic 
quality. Adam was the only participant who discussed his unwillingness to weaken his standards 
and added, “I wouldn’t do the job if I felt like there was not adequate attention paid to rigor. If I 
was being pressured or forced to water down my courses to boost retention or success, I 
wouldn’t do the job.”  
 As a nursing instructor, Sam viewed retention and success a little differently. Sam 
indicated that student retention is a problem for all nursing programs, not just ENCCC, due to 
nursing shortages. Unlike other participants who felt maintaining rigor was a challenge, Sam 
indicated the inherent difficulty of nursing programs demanding a balance between the rigor of 




Rigor will take people out of the program. There has to be a balance there. You can teach 
people how to be a safe entry-level practitioner, which is what the licensure examination 
is after. So our rigor has to be high enough that a person can be a safe practitioner, but 
yet, not so hard that we are taking people out of the program who could otherwise pass 
the licensure exam. There’s a fine line you are walking to try and maintain both of those 
areas. We are constantly looking at retention from a variety of areas, including whether or 
not the program is too rigorous.  
 Roslyn and Mark both discussed the challenges of maintaining retention and success 
standards while trying to manage student populations who often face difficult life situations. 
Roslyn added: 
In basic skills, our jobs are dependent on us being able to have the students show 
progress. It behooves us to make sure that every student is taking that seriously. When 
they stop coming, we have to show that we have tried to get them back and are doing 
something to keep them active in their educational pursuits.  
Both addressed the realities that students are often required to enroll in basic skills due to a 
variety of life situations and lack personal buy-in. Roslyn and Mark both indicated that the added 
pressure for retention and success wasn’t so much the product of the institution, but rather due to 
changes to the performance measure for basic skills progress.  
Participants at WNCCC were equally concerned with retention and success, but no 
participants indicated they were concerned with a lack of academic rigor. As previously 
mentioned, the last QEP at WNCCC created an academic resource center to specifically address 
student success. The ARC Lab, now almost ten years old, was designed to make additional 
resources, such as tutoring, readily available to students. A few participants discussed the 
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forthcoming QEP, which will specifically address student retention and success, but no details 
were available at the time of the interviews. Participants discussed the importance placed on 
retention and their responsibility as faculty to help ensure students stay enrolled. Similar to 
participants at ENCCC, James stated: 
Retention is always on the tip of everyone’s tongue, including our administration. The 
institution is funded through full-time enrollments, so our philosophy is customer service, 
advising, registration, recruit, retain, retain, retain. There’s a huge push right now 
institutionally to kind of move in the direction of covering any and all bases when it 
comes to retention and recruitment. It’s kind of considered the life line of the school.  
Clint shared similar thoughts while discussing the importance of retention but offered that, from 
a business model perspective, it was more cost effective to retain students than find new ones. He 
explained, “I think there’s an expectation that we should be producing a product that students are 
satisfied with, that they understand what they are doing, and that through advising we are 
grabbing them and putting them where they need to be.”  Other participants such as Joann and 
Aaron also acknowledge the importance of retention and success and the relationship to funding. 
Aaron indicated that the administration encouraged faculty to try hard and hold onto all students 
up until the 10% mark or census date. Students enrolled at the census date were counted towards 
the institutional enrollment and thus part of the full time equivalency for funding purposes.  
While all the participants at WNCCC discussed the importance of retention and success, 
only one participant indicated they felt additional pressure as a result. John stated: 
It’s been a little more stressful trying to keep those students that are on the edge from 
dropping off. You have to go that extra step, maybe make phone calls or send extra 
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emails to make that personal connection. Faculty have had to become therapist and 
counselors in order to help our students. The days of faculty just teaching are long gone.  
John’s comments also were similar to some participants at ENCCC. Ron stated, “I have had to 
have cheerleading sessions with students while trying to convince them to stay in the class. I 
can’t say I wouldn’t have done that in that past, but it seems to happen more frequently these 
days.” Stephanie also indicated that she tries to reach out to students more through phone calls or 
emails in an effort to encourage students to keep working hard. She explained, “There used to be 
a time when students came to class because they wanted to; now we spend an awful lot of time 
trying to track them down, see what’s going on, and act as their cheerleader.” While it was more 
work, Stacie felt as though she owed it to the student to go the extra mile. She added, “I could 
just drop students from my class when they overcut, but I feel like I spend a lot of my time 
leading up to that by calling them, emailing them, and sending alerts.”   
Experience Relative to External Agencies 
External agencies add institutional responsibilities that shape the out of class faculty 
experience. Excluding those faculty members at ENCCC who serve on the performance measure 
sub-committees, performance funding did not appear to have any impact on the out-of-class 
faculty experience at either WNCCC or ENCCC. Faculty obligations at both institutions 
involved common community college practices such as recruitment, academic advising, 
communication with students, and grading. At both institutions faculty were required to hold 5 
office hours per week. Participants did indicate however that external agencies and accrediting 
bodies add responsibilities and tasks that require their attention outside of the classroom.  
Both WNCCC and ENCCC are involved with accreditation efforts through SACSCOC, 
with WNCCC just beginning its reaccreditation process and ENCCC halfway through its current 
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QEP. Both institutions are utilizing full-time faculty from college transfer areas to facilitate the 
QEP process. While WNCCC has not finalized its QEP, the faculty representative stated that it 
was going to address student retention and success. ENCCC’s current QEP is examining student 
advising and academic planning within the college transfer student population. As part of the 
QEP at ENCCC, every college transfer faculty member is required to teach an academic success 
course, ACA 122, every third semester. These courses are specifically designed for new students 
and the instructor teaching the courses also serves as the academic advisor until the student 
completes 30 semester hours and maintains a 2.6 grade point average. Chuck, who is the QEP 
facilitator, indicated that his responsibilities decreased his course load by half but added 
significantly more assessment and reporting requirements. As the QEP facilitator, Chuck has also 
been responsible for scheduling the ACA 122 classes, as well as overseeing the course and 
providing periodical training for those faculty teaching it each semester. Chuck noted that while 
his regular teaching responsibilities have been reduced, he regularly has to pick up one or two 
ACA courses because there are not enough available faculty. In addition to those responsibilities, 
ENCCC added a retention and success software package for which Chuck is responsible for 
maintaining. While Chuck offered no negative comments towards his QEP responsibilities, his 
body language and facial expressions suggested he has grown tired of the process and is ready to 
get back to a regular teaching load. None of the other college transfer faculty at ENCCC 
discussed the QEP or referenced their responsibilities.  
The previous QEP at WNCCC resulted in the creation of an academic resource center or 
ARC Lab. As part of the original design of the ARC Lab, most faculty at WNCCC were required 
to hold at least two of their weekly office hours in the lab in an effort to assist students who were 
in need of academic assistance. While the previous QEP has been finished for five years, the 
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ARC Lab remains in place. Half of the participants, all college transfer faculty, indicated that 
they still spend time in the lab each week. The participants who indicated they did not spend time 
in the lab each week were either located off campus, taught in a specialized area such as BLET, 
or had their own lab, as was the case with John. The remaining participants were all very positive 
regarding the lab and the time they spend there each week. Clint stated, “Faculty really want to 
get behind things, like the lab, that support student success.”  
 Aside from SACSCOC, other participants identified accrediting bodies as having 
significant impact on their academic areas. Nearly all of the faculty who taught in areas requiring 
students to pass a state mandated test identified their accreditation bodies as significant external 
agencies. In fact, three of the four faculty in these areas indicated that accreditation standards 
supersede those of performance funding. At ENCCC, Sam stated that while performance funding 
was important, “Probably more in our face is the issue with accreditation and with our approval 
with the Board of Nursing. If we don’t have that, then we don’t have a program, and then 
performance measures become a moot point.” At WNCCC, Aaron indicated that while 
performance funding was important, the administrative code of Criminal Justice standards 
dictated everything he did as a faculty member. For example, Aaron is unable to accept any 
student who has a Class B misdemeanor within the last five years or any type of felony 
conviction. Students must also meet minimum physical standards. Similar to Sam, Aaron felt that 
the criminal justice standards he adheres to supersedes performance measures and adds 
additional pressures. He noted, “The stress level for me is very high. I feed a large area and have 
built a rapport with the surrounding agencies I serve. These agencies and their officers trust me 
to produce the best law enforcement possible.” Aaron added that while he is concerned with the 
performance measures, he’s more concerned with the success of the students, whether they pass 
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the exam on the first attempt or third attempt: “The agencies I serve have to know that I am 
producing capable law enforcement officers, not just officers that do well on a test.”  
Performance Funding Relative to Different Institutions 
The faculty response to performance funding measures varies according to the institution. 
Fairness is a matter of perception. The majority of participants at ENCCC viewed performance 
funding as unfair, whereas most participants at WNCCC viewed performance funding as 
generally fair or were indifferent altogether. Participants at ENCCC found performance funding 
to be unfair due to either the specification of individual measures or issues related to the 
measures viewed to be beyond their control. On the other hand, WNCCC participants generally 
identified performance funding as fair since all institutions were held to the same measures 
and/or measures inherently reward institutions and faculty for meeting the already established 
mission of the institution.  
All six of the college transfer participants at ENCCC felt performance funding was 
unfair. Those participants particularly felt it was unfair to hold community colleges responsible 
for a student’s poor performance at a senior institution upon transfer. Chuck summed up the 
collective sentiment when he stated:  
It’s nonsense to hold community colleges accountable for these students who transfer to a 
large university and are away from home for the first time. A lot of these kids are 
navigating their newly found freedom at the expense of their academic performance, yet 
it’s our (the community college) fault they do poorly?  
Other ENCCC transfer participants felt performance measures were unequally skewed towards 
college transfer or disciplines located within college transfer. Stacie felt pressure was 
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unnecessarily placed on college transfer faculty while many of the other faculty groups on 
campus were completely unrepresented. She added: 
We (math faculty) constantly worry about performance funding, so does English faculty, 
and we (all college transfer faculty) all indirectly worry about our transfer performance. 
But there are numerous faculty across campus that don’t have to worry about a single 
performance measure.  
Likewise, Jocelyn questioned the fairness of some programs, such as nursing or dental, which 
admit students using limited admission policies. She felt there was a sizable difference in student 
performance between the select students admitted to the nursing program every year and the rest 
of the open door campus. Stephanie echoed similar thoughts while acknowledging the open door 
nature of community colleges. Stephanie added: 
The beauty of the community college is that we take any and all students, but that doesn’t 
mean that all our students are prepared for college. The ugly truth is that a lot of students 
aren’t college ready, but we still have to teach them. I wonder what it would be like to 
only teach students that were above average and eager to learn. 
At both institutions, participants took exception to the idea that all colleges were measured 
equally. At WNCCC, John felt it was impossible for performance funding to be fairly 
administered when schools differ in location, resources, and student population. For example, 
Stephanie discussed the reality that ENCCC has not one but two innovative high schools within 
the county. The early college high school is located on ENCCC’s campus, while the STEM high 
school is located off campus. Innovative high school students typically do not complete their first 
college level math course until their junior year of high school. However, both the math and 
English performance measure previously measured student success in those courses within the 
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first two academic years. Stephanie offered, “We are not always comparing apples to apples; 
some counties don’t have any innovative high schools and we have two. For years, we have been 
penalized in math because 200 high school students weren’t taking college math until their junior 
year.” While WNCCC also had an early college high school on its campus, both James and John 
viewed early colleges as an asset not available to all colleges. From a student success model, 
James viewed early colleges as “resource rich” and possessive of a captive audience bound for 
success. He noted, “If retention is a measure of success, by default, those schools are going to 
perform better without having to do anything extra. Those students have few options in regards 
to dropping classes and are generally successful.” 
Non-nursing faculty within licensure areas at both institutions disagreed with the 
licensure pass rate performance measure only recognizing students who pass their licensure 
exams on the first attempt when some exams allow for multiple attempts. Gwen believed the 
measure was unfairly superseding the leniency afforded by the exams to each of the test takers: 
“When do we ever ask a paramedic how many times it took them to pass their certification 
exam? We don’t, yet our performance measure is holding institutions accountable for a guideline 
that is non-existent.” Similarly, at WNCCC, Aaron felt that the licensure pass rate performance 
measure placed a “stigma” on students who didn’t pass the test on the first attempt while adding 
additional pressure that isn’t necessary. Aaron stated, “Whether it’s the first time, third time, or 
fifth time, what difference does it make? A pass is a pass.” Contrary to Gwen and Aaron, Susan 
and Sam, as nursing faculty, were both much more supportive of the licensure exam pass rate. 
Both participants viewed first attempt success rates as marketing and recruiting tools. Susan 
stated, “It’s a real plus for us to be able to share our success rates with local providers when 
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trying to place our students at clinical sites.” Similarly, Sam viewed success rates as 
“justification for all the hard work put in by both faculty and students.”    
  At WNCCC, participants who viewed performance measures as fair were much more 
likely to view them as indicators of personal success. As the only faculty member in her 
discipline, Donna viewed performance funding as fair and added “I think it’s fair for me because 
my students do well. I don’t think you should have a problem with it if you’re doing your job and 
working hard at it.” Jessica shared similar sentiments and added that student success is the job of 
all faculty members. She found it troubling that there was even a need for performance measures, 
commenting, “It’s ridiculous that it takes performance measures to make people do their job. If 
it’s not someone’s goal to help students succeed, then they don’t need to be teaching.” Likewise, 
Joann found it appropriate to hold faculty to common standards: “If students aren’t being 
successful, shouldn’t we want to know? I think it’s completely fair to hold faculty to some 
standard of success.” Clint also viewed performance funding as fair, but offered a more 
measured response in stating: 
Yes, it’s fair as in its being applied evenly across all 58 institutions. I see it as an attempt 
at control from a central place, which I understand, I guess. We (institutions) are given 
money and in return something is expected, so that makes perfect sense to me.  
While Clint felt performance funding was fair, he was skeptical of its use as an incentive: “In a 
resource poor environment, the proverbial carrot that is performance funding can quickly turn 
into a whip.” When pressed further as to how that transpires at WNCCC, Clint offered that he 
wasn’t sure it had, but felt performance funding “compounds whatever issues already exist due 





There is a lack of faculty opposition to performance funding. At both institutions, 
participants failed to voice or demonstrate any real opposition to performance funding. In 
general, participants at ENCCC and WNCCC viewed performance funding as an added addition 
to an already challenging job description. However, at ENCCC, participants were much more 
likely to use the words “pressure,” “fear,” and “resentment” when discussing their response to 
performance funding and acknowledged that informal conversations between faculty occur. 
Stacie offered: 
I think, as is the case with most initiatives, there’s informal conversations that happen 
about performance measures. You know that some instructors don’t have to worry about 
it because they teach in an area that isn’t specifically tied to a performance measure. It 
kind of puts a lot of pressure on the ones that do to have to live up to the measures. 
Roslyn added:  
There is a constant fear due to the fact that even though we’re at the top, every year the 
state is knocking us down a little more or changing the metrics. We are being asked to do 
more with less. There’s a lot of stress on us that performance measures doesn’t take into 
consideration given the real realities of what we do. 
Gwen was hesitant to regard faculty conversations as pushback, but added:  
I think it puts a lot of pressure on the divisions and the instructors because it’s almost like 
elementary school end of grade testing. We are being forced to push the test more and 
more to make sure our students pass it.  
Adam scoffed at the idea of any formal opposition to performance funding, but added, “I think 
individually, everyone kind of has, I don’t want to say a fear, but a little bit of anxiousness about 
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performance funding becoming the norm or even expanding.” Ron stated, “I don’t think it’s been 
on a front channel type of thing, it is more discussions within department meetings and in 
between faculty members, but there is a certain level of resentment.” 
Mirroring their perceptions of fairness, the majority of participants at WNCCC indicated 
there were no conversations, informal or formal, between faculty regarding performance funding. 
In fact, when asked about opposition to performance funding, most faculty responded to the 
question with a simple response of “no”. James, Bethany, Susan, John, and Joann indicated that 
they had never had a conversation with another faculty member regarding performance funding. 
Clint articulated the sentiment of the group by stating: 
You know, it (opposition) hasn’t been presented as an option. I mean…because it’s not, 
right? So nobody goes around flogging performance funding as either good or bad. It’s 
part of the landscape. We don’t really talk much about the additional funding that we get 
based on…I’m trying to think if I’ve ever heard it.  
Only one participant at WNCCC voiced an opinion that reflected that of outright opposition. 
Elaine felt as though performance funding was merely the newest initiative designed to garner 
attention and that faculty simply will “get with it, roll with it, and do well until the next new 
thing comes along.” Elaine also viewed performance funding as “just another number” and felt 
as though “there are things you can do to meet that number.” When asked to elaborate, she stated 
she merely meant institutions and faculty are very adaptable at responding to system-wide 
initiatives. Excluding Elaine, all of the participants at ENCCC and WNCCC felt performance 
funding was here to stay and viewed it as a permanent piece of the higher education landscape. 
  Three major assertions were derived from this study as a result of the analysis of the 
individual cases and the cross-case comparison of how the experiences of community college 
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faculty are shaped by performance funding initiatives. The findings were (1) Faculty experiences 
are shaped according to the institutions overall capacity and response to performance funding; 
(2) The awareness of faculty regarding performance funding is dependent upon the institutions 
efforts to share information; (3) Depending upon the institution, faculty can be seen as both 
street-level bureaucrats and passive recipients of performance funding initiatives. The 
conclusions regarding how the experiences of community college faculty are shaped by 
performance funding initiatives support, in part, the theoretical frameworks of this study, which 
are principal-agent theory and bottom-up policy perspectives. Principal-agent theory was used 
due to the multi-directional aspect of performance funding models. Viewing institutions as 
principals and faculty as agents allows faculty to be seen as street-level bureaucrats and for 
performance funding to be examined from a bottom-up policy perspective. This study found that 
the faculty experience varies across institutions due in part to the overall capacity of the 
institution to respond, the role of the institution as a principal, and how faculty respond to 
institutional initiatives. 
Summary 
 This chapter presented the findings of the data collected through interviews, observations, 
and documentation. Themes and subthemes that emerged from this data were presented using 
passages from interviews in an effort to emphasize the experiences of each participant. A cross-
case comparison was also provided. The six themes and four subthemes of this study summarize 
how the experiences of community college faculty are shaped by performance funding 
initiatives. 
The institutions in this study varied in their overall size, student enrollment, and operating 
budgets. These differences, in part, help explain differences in the faculty experience at each 
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institution. ENCCC was found to have sufficient operating budgets, student enrollments, and 
organizational capacity to respond to performance funding measures. In addition, ENCCC was 
found to have a large organizational chart, which included prominent structures such as the 
Planning Council and Office of Institutional Effectiveness. WNCCC had significantly lower 
operating budgets, student enrollments, and overall capacity to respond to performance 
measures. WNCCC’s organizational chart was much smaller than ENCCC’s and was not found 
to have anything similar to ENCCC’s Planning Council. Finally, due to the budget constraints 
present at WNCCC, participants voiced concern regarding consecutive years of reductions in 
force which resulted in the loss of faculty and staff positions.  
Participants across both institutions generally felt uninformed or were skeptical of the 
information shared by their institution. While the majority of participants across both institutions 
indicated performance funding has no impact on their in-class experience, those who did believe 
it adds additional pressures or stress. These pressures and stress are further exacerbated by an 
increased focus on retention and success which is the result of constrained budgets and a funding 
formula that focuses on full-time enrollment. The majority of all participants indicated the 
pressure of retention and success impacted their experiences as faculty. The experiences of 
faculty at both institutions were also shown to be impacted by outside accrediting bodies and 
licensing efforts. Given the differences between institutions, interestingly, not all participants 
found performance funding to be unfair. Participants at ENCCC were much more likely to view 
performance funding as unfair compared to participants at WNCCC who either viewed it as fair 
or were indifferent altogether. Regardless of their views on fairness, participants at both 
institutions failed to voice any opposition to performance funding measures. Participants at both 
institutions saw performance funding as an addition to their job description. Participants at 
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ENCCC, however, were much more likely to describe their response to performance funding 
using words such as “pressure”, “fear”, and “resentment.” Chapter 5 will provide a summary, 
conclusions, theoretical and practical implications, and recommendations for future research.  
 
 
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS,  
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to compare how performance funding programs shape 
faculty experiences at two North Carolina Community Colleges. This study was necessary for 
two reasons. First, existing research indicates that performance funding advocates and policy 
framers have been successful at communicating the overall goals of performance funding 
initiatives and creating widespread institutional buy-in amongst senior administrators. Faculty, 
however, have been shown to be much less knowledgeable of such programs or their impacts 
(Dougherty et al., 2014). Second, a review of existing literature found no research that solely 
examined the experiences of faculty regarding performance funding. The experiences of faculty 
as they relate to performance funding initiatives are equally as important as those of policy 
framers and campus administrators (Lahr et al., 2014). Findings from this study contributed to 
the lack of research examining the impact of performance funding on community college faculty. 
The voices of community college faculty provide rich details of their experiences as they respond 
to institutional performance funding initiatives and the role they play in shaping organizational 
culture.  
Summary of the Study 
This was a qualitative comparative case study of two North Carolina Community 
Colleges located in western and eastern North Carolina. Relevant documentation was retrieved 
from the websites of both institutions, as well as the North Carolina Community College System 
website. All documentation was publicly available and included Board of Trustees meetings, 
strategic plans, performance measures success reports, budget allocation reports, and 
organizational charts. Ten participants at each college were selected from academic areas 
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specifically related to established performance funding measures. Two faculty were selected 
from the curriculum math department; the curriculum English department; college transfer; 
basic skills; and licensure programs from each institution for a total of twenty participants. 
The college settings were selected based upon their student enrollment, budget allocation 
information, and performance reporting and funding summary data.  
Data were collected utilizing semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and direct 
observation. All interviews were conducted on the participant’s respective community college 
campus and lasted approximately one hour. All interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed with specific attention to the confidentiality requirements of the study. Printed and 
electronic documents relating to performance funding were collected and analyzed as well.  
From this study, six major themes and four subthemes emerged from the data regarding 
how the experiences of community college faculty are shaped by performance funding 
initiatives: 
1.  The awareness of performance funding measures is relative to faculty member’s 
obligations within the institution and their overall desire to be informed 
a. Faculty are familiar with performance funding, but lack specific knowledge 
b. The dissemination of information regarding institutional performance varies and 
is dependent upon the sharing of information 
2.  The institutional response to performance funding measures is dependent upon the 
organizational capacity and budgetary capabilities of each institution 
3.  How performance measures shape the in-class faculty is dependent upon the 
institution and overall perceptions of faculty  
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4.  Institutional focus on retention and success have indirect impacts on the in-class 
experience 
5.  External agencies add institutional responsibilities that shape the out of class faculty 
experience 
6.  The faculty response to performance funding measures varies according to the 
institution 
a. Fairness is a matter of perception 
b. There is a lack of faculty opposition to performance funding 
Findings 
 Three major assertions were derived from this study as a result of the analysis of the 
individual cases and the cross-case comparison of how the experiences of community college 
faculty are shaped by performance funding initiatives. The findings were (1) Faculty experiences 
are shaped according to the institutions overall capacity and response to performance funding; 
(2) The awareness of faculty regarding performance funding is dependent upon the institutions 
efforts to share information; (3) Depending upon the institution, faculty can be seen as both 
street-level bureaucrats and passive recipients of performance funding initiatives. The 
conclusions regarding how the experiences of community college faculty are shaped by 
performance funding initiatives support, in part, the theoretical frameworks of this study, which 
are principal-agent theory and bottom-up policy perspectives. Principal-agent theory was used 
due to the multi-directional aspect of performance funding models. Viewing institutions as 
principals and faculty as agents allows faculty to be seen as street-level bureaucrats and for 
performance funding to be examined from a bottom-up policy perspective. This study found that 
the faculty experience varies across institutions due in part to the overall capacity of the 
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institution to respond, the role of the institution as a principal, and how faculty respond to 
institutional initiatives.  
Faculty Experiences Influenced by Institutional Capacity 
Faculty experiences are shaped according to the institutions overall capacity and response 
to performance funding. When used as a policy instrument, performance funding has been shown 
to create new demands on academic institutions. However, as shown in the literature, scarce 
attention has been paid to the ability of institutions to respond to such initiatives. The capacity to 
respond varies significantly across institutions according to available resources (Dougherty et al., 
2016). Resources, as it relates to institutional capacity, are not limited to only budgetary 
allotments, but include adequate faculty and staff, physical space/classrooms, policies and 
procedures, and organizational structures. Dougherty et al. (2016) suggest that performance 
funding advocates pay little attention to “the capacity of colleges to respond to the demands of 
performance funding, particularly through effective organizational learning…” (p. 149). The data 
in this study supported this research while illuminating the differences in organizational 
capacities to respond at WNCCC and ENCCC. Data from this study suggest, as was exemplified 
at ENCCC, increased student enrollments and operating budgets lead to larger organizational 
hierarchies, greater institutional capacity, and institutional oversight which are the bedrock of 
principal-agent theory. Matland (1995) and Dougherty et al. (2016) suggest that as the 
institution’s role of principal increases, so too does the opportunity for faculty to act as agents 
and street-level bureaucrats as they respond to the initiatives handed down by the institution. 
However, this opportunity is dependent upon the awareness of institutional initiatives by faculty. 
As was seen at ENCCC, faculty who were not part of the planning council were less aware of 
efforts such as the performance measure subcommittees.  
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 The institutions in this study varied greatly in their overall capacity and organizational 
hierarchies. ENCCC employed three times as many faculty as WNCCC and had a significantly 
larger President’s Council. Nine out of ten participants at ENCCC belonged to departments 
consisting of five to ten faculty members and a department chair or program director. Previous 
research by Harbour and Nagy (2005) and Natow et al. (2014) found that performance funding 
influenced institutions to engage in activities designed to improve performance ratings. 
Examples of this dynamic existed at ENCCC, as it was shown to be significantly more active in 
its use of campus committees and assessment, both of which had impacts on the overall faculty 
experience. As an average sized NCCCS institution, ENCCC possessed sufficient budgetary 
allotments and human capital in the form of administrators and faculty to respond to performance 
funding through the creation of performance measure subcommittees as part of the institution’s 
Planning Council. In addition to the Planning Council and individual performance 
subcommittees, ENCCC collects retention and success data from every faculty member at the 
conclusion of each academic semester through the Institutional Effectiveness Department.  
 ENCCC’s creation and use of the Planning Council, performance measure 
subcommittees, and the collection of retention and success data exemplifies the Principal-Agent 
framework. ENCCC’s response to performance funding ultimately created a system in which the 
principal (ENCCC) could monitor and influence the behaviors of the agents (faculty) 
(McClendon, 2003a). Given that performance funding is embedded within the construct of the 
planning council, which includes performance measure subcommittees, and is an active part of 
its five-year strategic plan, the participants at ENCCC were more familiar with performance 
funding than their counterparts at WNCCC. However, participants at ENCCC were much more 
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likely to voice feelings of anxiety, stress, and pressure towards performance funding and overall 
accountability.  
 Unlike ENCCC, WNCCC was shown to lack the overall capacity to respond to 
performance funding. There was no evidence of any institutional committees similar to 
ENCCC’s Planning Council or performance measure subcommittees. Contrary to previous 
research, there appeared to be no real action or activities on the part of the institution to improve 
or maintain performance ratings. As a condition of their overall size, faculty were much more 
concerned with the effects of institutional budget constraints which had resulted in reductions in 
force over the previous several years. The budget woes at WNCCC have created an environment 
in which the faculty experience has grown increasingly stressful, but not as a result of 
performance funding. Instead, few faculty viewed performance funding as stressful or 
problematic. Rather, it was viewed as a positive incentive for doing well and an additional 
revenue stream for an already financially strapped campus. Furthermore, outside of the 
information shared at campus-wide meetings, participants indicated that performance funding or 
measures are not discussed amongst the faculty, either formally or informally.  
 The findings above indicate that the Principal-Agent dynamic was very evident at 
ENCCC. The rewards of performance funding have been deemed sufficient enough by 
administrators to warrant efforts designed specifically to secure compliant behavior from faculty, 
resulting in increased performance and monetary incentives. This compliance is sought primarily 
through the use of the performance measure subcommittees, which are responsible for evaluating 
performance data and developing strategies to improve individual measures. Compliance is 
further sought through the use of institutional reporting mechanisms in which each subcommittee 
chair is responsible for submitting strategies and action items to the Institutional Effectiveness 
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Office. Additionally, subcommittee chairs are responsible for reporting their efforts to the 
Planning Council periodically. Faculty members serving on the Planning Council and 
subcommittees have tremendous opportunity to respond individually and as a collective group. 
However, given the exclusivity of the Planning Council and subcommittees, the ability of faculty 
to participate in policy shaping activities is limited and completely dependent on the sharing of 
information by those committee members.  
Faculty Awareness Influenced by Institutional Communication 
The awareness of faculty regarding performance funding is dependent upon the 
institutions’ efforts to share information. Existing research on performance funding has shown 
that faculty tend to be less knowledgeable of performance funding initiatives than campus 
administrators (Dougherty et al., 2014). According to Dougherty et al. (2016), the lack of 
awareness is a product of the demands placed on faculty, lack of involvement in decision-making 
matters involving performance funding, and a withholding of information deemed irrelevant to 
faculty. Participants at both ENCCC and WNCCC indicated that the institutions shared 
performance funding information at campus wide meetings held each academic year. However, 
the extent of the information at both institutions was limited and more of a summary of the 
overall performance report.  
While aligning with the institution’s overall capacity and response, participants at 
ENCCC were more exposed to information than their counterparts at WNCCC. ENCCC utilized 
its Convocation, Planning Council, and performance measure subcommittees to disseminate 
information. Convocation was the only source of information that was also available to all 
faculty. All of the participants at ENCCC spoke favorably of Convocation. Each of the 
participants at ENCCC was familiar with performance funding, but the majority of participants 
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indicated they desired more in-depth information than provided at Convocation. While the 
Planning Council and performance measure subcommittees were a significant source of 
information, a disconnect existed between the faculty who were part of the Planning Council and 
subcommittees and those who were not. It was apparent that some of the faculty who were on the 
Planning Council and/or performance measure subcommittees were not actively sharing 
information from those meetings and activities with their colleagues.  
As opposed to the participants at ENCCC, WNCCC participants voiced considerably less 
enthusiasm for the campus wide meetings. Participants also voiced skepticism in the institution’s 
effort to share information. Participants indicated that communication had been a historical 
challenge at WNCCC across both years and administrations. As a result, only five out of ten 
participants at WNCCC were familiar with performance funding. Given the lack of institutional 
committees such as ENCCC’s Planning Council or performance measure subcommittees, faculty 
at WNCCC were completely dependent upon the administration for the dissemination of 
information.  
Previous research on performance funding and faculty morale indicates that if faculty are 
unaware of the impacts of performance funding on their campuses, they are much less likely to 
actively help in shaping their institution’s response (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). Aside from 
participants at ENCCC who participated in the Planning Council and performance measure 
subcommittees, participants at both ENCCC and WNCCC lacked specific knowledge of the 
impacts of performance funding on their campuses. This lack of information undermines the 
dynamic that is bottom-up policy perspective, as it diminishes the role of the local actors and 




Faculty Negative Perceptions of Performance Funding 
Depending upon the institution, faculty can loosely be seen as both street-level 
bureaucrats and passive recipients of performance funding initiatives. The lack of awareness on 
the part of faculty has been shown in previous research to erode faculty participation in shared 
governance, which in turn presents faculty as passive actors and reactive to institutional 
instructions. However, street-level bureaucracy suggests that faculty see performance funding 
programs as attacks on their profession, autonomy, and overall expertise. While participants in 
this study did not voice outright opposition to performance funding or provide examples of 
faculty pushback, the majority of participants at ENCCC viewed performance funding as unfair. 
Participants used words such as “fear” and “resentment” when discussing their response to 
performance funding. Several participants acknowledged that informal conversations occur 
between colleagues and behind the closed doors of department meetings. In addition to the 
perceptions of unfairness, four of the ten participants at ENCCC indicated that performance 
funding had not had any direct impact on their classroom experience. Each of these participants 
indicated that they choose not to think about performance funding or make instructional 
decisions based on performance measures. These findings are supportive of Lipsky’s (1980) and 
Malak’s (2015) research that suggested faculty may choose to apply, adapt, or ignore campus 
policies aimed at improving performance. These participants have essentially chosen to ignore 
performance funding and the measures impacting their campus and specific academic 
disciplines.  
 Given their overall lack of awareness and institutional capacity, participants at WNCCC 
were generally considered passive recipients of performance funding. While participants 
indicated they don’t think about performance or that it hasn’t impacted their in-class experience, 
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it is unlikely to be the result of defiance or street-level bureaucracy. Instead, the majority of 
participants viewed performance funding as an extension of their job description. Given the 
realities of their budget situation, participants generally viewed performance funding as a 
welcome addition, thus rendering any opposition moot. Also, it is worth noting that six of the ten 
participants openly declared an appreciation for their job and institution. Statements included “I 
love my job,” “It’s the best job I’ve ever had,” and “I wouldn’t change a thing about my job.” 
While these sentiments could be the result of a social desirability effect, participants genuinely 
seemed happy and content with their work. Participants taught more hours, more students, and 
were responsible for more ancillary tasks than their counterparts at ENCCC. Given the realities 
of the budget situation at WNCCC, the data support the idea that faculty at WNCCC are simply 
happy to be employed given the budget situation and presence of reductions in force.  
Implications for Theory and Practice 
 The findings of this study offer implications for theory and practice from the community 
college faculty perspective regarding how their experiences are shaped by performance funding 
initiatives. Relative to theory, implications for examining performance funding through the lens 
of Principal-Agent Theory, Bottom-Up Policy Perspective, and faculty as street-level bureaucrats 
are provided. From a practical perspective, implications are provided for community college 
administrators and faculty regarding performance funding and efforts to better include faculty in 
such initiatives.  
The findings of this study suggest that the experiences of community college faculty are 
shaped in various ways depending on the institution’s capacity and response to performance 
funding initiatives. The institutions included in this study were vastly different in not only 




 The theoretical frameworks that guided this study were Principal-Agent Theory, Bottom-
Up Policy Perspective, and street-level bureaucracy. Institutions, while acting as principals, use 
campus initiatives to elicit behavior from the campus agents (faculty) that are supposed to result 
in improved performance and financial incentives. Faculty act as street level bureaucrats as they 
resist, ignore, or modify the campus initiatives and in turn begin to adapt and merge the campus 
initiatives into the realities of their everyday tasks and responsibilities. The study demonstrated 
that while performance funding can result in the Principal-Agent dynamic, Bottom-Up policy 
perspective, and street-level bureaucracy, each of those is dependent upon the sharing of 
information. When faculty lack familiarity or are unaware of performance funding or its impact 
on the institution, the ability of faculty to respond or take part in shaping the institutional 
response is diminished. In addition, Principal-Agent Theory, Bottom-Up Policy perspective, and 
street-level bureaucracy are dependent upon the institution acting like a principal in their 
response to initiatives such as performance funding. According to Dougherty et al. (2016), 
institutions are revenue maximizers and will make significant efforts to improve their 
performance if funding is deemed sufficient enough. However, institutional efforts often negate 
demands on faculty time and demonstrate a lack of faculty involvement in decision making 
processes. As demonstrated in this study, when an institution is small and suffers significant 
budget constraints, the budget woes take precedent and create greater problems than those of 
performance funding.  
Practical Implications 
 Understanding how the experiences of community college faculty are shaped by 
performance funding initiatives is important to all institutions as they develop campus initiatives 
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aimed at improving overall performance metrics. Practical implications of this study are 
provided and focus on the roles of both institutions and faculty in positively shaping the faculty 
experience. In addition, an implication for educational systems is included that addresses their 
efforts in creating performance funding systems that account for the differences in institutions. 
These implications were derived from the individual cases, as well as from the comparative case 
analysis, and are presented in the following section.  
 Information regarding performance funding and any subsequent budgetary allotments 
should be readily available to all faculty. Participants at WNCCC and ENCCC voiced a desire to 
have access to greater information than what was presented to them at campus meetings by 
administrators. While participants were generally aware of performance funding, several 
participants voiced frustration over not understanding how the metrics were calculated. An 
immediate solution would be for institutions to print color copies of the Performance Measures 
for Student Success report that is released annually. It is important that the copies are in color so 
that faculty can easily read and digest the report. Along with printing the report, institutions 
should make information regarding the funds received from each performance measure, as well 
as the total institutional allotment. At both institutions in this study, participants were unaware of 
the financial implications associated with the performance measures and desired greater 
transparency. Participants at both institutions found it difficult to be overly concerned with 
performance when they couldn’t see the tangible impact on their classroom. This is particularly 
important for faculty who teach in disciplines aligned with specific performance measures such 
as curriculum English, math, college transfer performance, and licensure pass rates. It is 
expected that the faculty buy-in would be greater if faculty were able to see the tangible impacts 
of their efforts in the classroom.  
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 Another practical implication involves institutions’ attempts at creating initiatives and 
response mechanisms that are not inclusive of the entire faculty body. As was the case with 
ENCCC, information flowed from the top, beginning with the President’s Council, down to the 
Planning Council, on to the performance measure subcommittees. However, actions taken at the 
Planning Council and subcommittee levels were not being shared as was intended. Some 
participants at ENCCC were unaware that such subcommittees even existed. The creation of 
such performance measure subcommittees appeared void of any real shared governance on the 
part of faculty and were the creation of the previous president as part of a response to 
performance funding. In some instances, the recommendations and action strategies of the 
subcommittees appeared to be superficial and irrelevant to the actual work of the faculty. This 
type of dynamic diminishes the role of faculty and undermines their subject matter expertise. 
Likewise, it causes faculty to be suspicious of institutional attempts aimed at improving the 
educational environment.  
 Given the findings of this study, conditions were present at both institutions potentially 
leading to the weakening of academic standards. At ENCCC, the presence of the Planning 
Council and subcommittees, along with retention and success reporting mechanisms, has created 
an environment in which faculty voiced feelings of stress, fear, and pressure. On the other hand, 
participants at WNCCC operated in an environment void of any apparent oversight. Furthermore, 
some participants at WNCCC were the sole faculty in their respective disciplines, and few 
reported directly to a department chair. While there was no evidence of weakened academic 
standards at either institution, it is fair to ask how one would know otherwise. As shared by 
participants, a premium had been placed on retention and success at both institutions. 
Performance measures such as student success rates in curriculum English and math, first year 
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progression, and curriculum completion are all measures of successful completion but are not 
necessarily indicative of student learning. Research has shown that grade inflation is a natural 
corrective to the inherent pressures of performance funding, as faculty try to balance their own 
educational standards against those of performance funding which increasingly value retention, 
success, and completion.  
 Finally, educational systems should examine performance funding systems while 
weighing the capability of all institutions to effectively respond. As was shown in this study, 
institutions such as WNCCC are barely keeping the institution afloat under normal funding 
conditions. The addition of performance funding initiatives only adds additional pressures that 
the institution may be incapable of meeting. While participants at WNCCC viewed performance 
funding allocations as positive additions to the overall budget, performance allocations had been 
less than $150,000, or approximately 2% of the total budget each of the previous five years. 
WNCCC was one example of a small institution with above average performance funding 
results, but there are other examples of schools smaller than WNCCC with even smaller budgets, 
lower student enrollment, and below average performance. All institutions are not created 
equally, and while the performance measures are designed to be measured equally, as was shown 
in this study, there are stark contrasts in institutions.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Some of the findings in this study are consistent with existing scholarly literature on 
performance funding and its impact on institutions; however, there exists further opportunities 
for future research. Given the scarcity of research examining the impact of performance funding 
on the faculty experience, the first recommendation is further qualitative research that includes a 
significantly larger sample size of faculty participants and institutions. This study only examined 
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two institutions that were in the 50th and bottom 25th percentiles in enrollment and operating 
budget, with each representing the top 25th percentile in performance funding. Given that all 58 
North Carolina Community Colleges are measured using performance indicators, there remain 
56 other institutions and faculty participants available for study.  
 The second recommendation is a future study that examines the impact of performance 
funding on adjunct faculty exclusively. Adjunct faculty comprised more than 60% of the faculty 
body at both institutions included in this study. According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics, adjunct faculty now comprise more than half of the faculty bodies across the nation 
and within the NCCCS. While this study included two participants who were considered part-
time, it was not was reflective of the part-time faculty experience given their position and 
responsibilities on the campus. Given that the full-time faculty in this study lacked knowledge 
concerning performance funding, it is almost certain that part-time faculty would be even less 
knowledgeable. Events such as ENCCC’s Convocation and other institutional meetings are 
rarely attended by part-time faculty given their geographical locations or commitments to other 
full-time careers.  
Summary and Conclusion 
 This chapter included a restatement of the purpose of the study, setting, methodology, 
and emergent themes. Also included were the conclusions, theoretical implications, practical 
implications, and recommendations for future research. The conclusions of the study were: (1) 
Faculty experiences are shaped according to the institutions overall capacity and response to 
performance funding; (2) The awareness of faculty regarding performance funding is dependent 
upon the institutions efforts to share information; and (3) Depending upon the institution, faculty 
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can be seen as both street-level bureaucrats and passive recipients of performance funding 
initiatives. 
 Theoretical implications and practical implications emerged from the findings and 
conclusions. The theoretical implications includes that the Principal-Agent Dynamic, Bottom-Up 
policy perspective, and street-level bureaucracy are dependent upon the sharing of information. 
Faculty cannot effectively respond to initiatives they are unfamiliar with. In addition, Principal-
Agent Theory, Bottom-Up Policy perspective, and street-level bureaucracy are dependent upon 
the institution acting like a principal in their response to initiatives such as performance funding. 
In cases where other priorities or concerns trump those such as performance funding, the faculty 
response is focused squarely on the most pressing issue. 
Finally, the practical implications of this study include the following: (1) information 
regarding performance funding and any subsequent budgetary allotments should be readily 
available to all faculty; (2) an institution’s attempts at creating initiatives and response 
mechanisms should be inclusive of the entire faculty body; (3) performance funding creates 
conditions potentially leading to the weakening of academic standards; and (4) educational 
systems should examine performance funding systems while weighing the capability of all 
institutions to effectively respond.   
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that performance funding has varying impacts on 
the faculty experience. It is important that campus administrators effectively communicate 
performance funding goals with faculty and subsequently allow all faculty to be part of shaping 
an institutions response to such initiatives. As was shown in this study, all institutions are not 
created equally. Institutions with sufficient organizational capacity may over respond which in 
turn places additional stress, pressure, and fear on the faculty. Other institutions may lack 
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APPENDIX B: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL  
 
Semi-structured Interview Protocol (Creswell, 2013): Understanding how the faculty experience is shaped 
by performance funding initiatives: A comparative case study. 
Time of Interview:    
Date:      
Place:     
Interviewer:   
Interviewee:    
Position of Interviewee:  
   
Description of the Project: This study is designed to understand how are the experiences of community 
college faculty shaped by intended and unintended impacts of performance funding initiatives. 
Questions: 
1. How long have you been employed as a faculty by ENCC/WNCC? What academic discipline(s) do 
you teach? 
2. Describe your understanding of the current North Carolina Community College System’s 
Performance Funding Initiative. 
*Probe possibility – If no knowledge of PF, how about budget as a whole OR matters of retention & 
success if in math and English.  
3. Describe how faculty receive information concerning NCCCS performance funding and any 
subsequent impacts on your institution.  
*Probe possibility - If no information concerning PF, how do faculty receive information in general? 
What type of information do faculty receive? 
4. Discuss how the NCCCS performance funding initiative has shaped your in-class experience as a 
faculty? 
*Probe - Has there been any significant focus directed at a particular area, such as retention & 
success? Why?  
5. Discuss how the NCCCS performance funding initiative has shaped your experiences outside the 
classroom? 
*Probe possibility – What does your time outside of the classroom look like? What consumes your 
times? 
6. Discuss how your institution has responded to performance funding?   
*Probe possibility – Are there any new committees or campus activities that exist now that did not 
prior to 2012? 
7. How have you or other faculty responded to performance funding on your campus? 
Probe possibility – Informally or formally, has there been any pushback or resistance to PF? 
8. Aside from the eight specific performance measures, describe how performance funding has impacted 
you specifically and all faculty in general. 
9. In general, do you think the experiences you have shared with me today are similar to other faculty, 
both on your campus and across the other 57 NCCCS campuses? 
10. Is there anything else that you would like to add concerning your experience as a faculty as it relates 
to performance funding? 
 
Thank you for your time and participation. Your participation will remain confidential. If necessary, I 
hope you will be willing to participate in future interviews.
 
 
 
